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The study of state courts of last resort is a field which has, up until recently, been
significantly underrepresented in political science (Baum 1987, Dubois 1980). The bulk
of work injudicial politics over the last fifty years has focused on the federal system.
Furthermore, the study of state courts allows for a true comparative analysis. The
methods of selection used for the staffing of state courts of last resort are highly varied.
There are five distinctly different methods which are used for judicial selection in the
states, and many states have institutional nuances that provide further variation for study.
This dissertation will utilize event history analysis to examine if the method of selection
in state courts of last resort has a causal effect on the tenure of Supreme Court justices

under a variety of different political contexts. Event history analysis is the appropriate
method in order to answer this question, as it will allow me to examine first, what the
determinants of judicial tenure length are, and second, compare the selection methods to
each other.

I will examine three related aspects of methods of selection for state supreme
courts. First, I will enter the debate concerning the accountability and independence
elicited by the different methods of selection. Second, I will examine the effect of
campaign spending by challengers and incumbents on the length ofjudicial tenure in

states which utilize elections. Third, I will examine to what level judges across all

methods of selection behave strategically with regard to retirement. I find that out of out
each of the methods of selection, partisan elections exhibit the most accountability, with

retention elections exhibiting the least. Also, in states which elect their judges, the
amount of money spent during the election has no statistical effect on the term length of

the justice. Finally, justices in all systems are likely to engage in strategic retirement,
however in different ways. Justices who are elected retire when their likelihood of
electoral defeat is high while justices who are appointed are likely to retire when an
ideologically congruent body can choose their replacement.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, Iowa witnessed an occurrence than had not happened in the state's entire

history. In the retention elections for the State Supreme Court, three justices (Chief
Justice Marsha K. Ternus, Justice Michael J. Streit, and Justice David L. Baker) were

removed from office by the voters. This event was particularly newsworthy as not a

single judge in the history of Iowa had failed to be retained, yet on November 2, 2010
everyjudge standing for retention was removed from office. In response to the Supreme
Court case Varnum v. Brien (2009), which unanimously overturned a statute that

outlawed gay marriage, many out-of-state organizations including the National

Organization for Marriage and the American FamilyAssociation spent over $3 million to
defeat the three justices at the polls. This, according to the Brennan Center for Justice,
was more than was spent in the entire previous decade on retention elections in Iowa

(Sulzberger 2010). These three sitting justices, and indeed anyjustice from Iowa, had
never faced such a well-funded outside challenge to their legitimacy. Furthermore, these

justices who had never had to campaign before were left ill-equipped to fight back.
According to the New York Times the three justices, "did not raise money to campaign
and only toward the end of the election did they make public appearances to defend
themselves (Sukzberger 2010)."

Groups such as the American Judicature Society (AJS) and the Brennan Center
for Justice, which promote the use of merit selection and retention elections as a means to

populate the bench in order to further their goal of selecting the most qualified judges
while keeping them publically accountable, ultimately turned their ire on the special
interest money which they argued led to the justices' defeat. Bert Brandenburg,

executive director of the Brennan Center for Justice stated, "Judges are facing more
demands to be accountable to interest groups and political campaigns instead of the law

and the constitution (2010).1" While groups such as the AJS promote retention elections
as a means to keep judges accountable, in 2010, accountability at the polls shocked them.
Rachel Paine Caufield, research fellow for the AJS, stated, "[retention elections] are

meant to serve a very similar check as impeachment. It was not originally intended to be
used for ideological or partisan purposes" (Duffelmeye 2011).

The normative implications regarding methods ofjudicial selection have often

fueled the debate concerning what type of system a state should use. Couched in the
terms of "independence v. accountability," many groups have actively rallied around one
system with the goal of either balancing, or maximizing one of these two competing
values. Therefore, states celebrating their right of self-determination under the U.S.
federalist constitution have resulted in an extremely heterogeneous mixture concerning
the methods of selection used to staff their courts of last resort.

The various states within the U.S. truly are a garden of democracy. The states

truly have, "Let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend." The
variation of thoughts, movements, and institutional dynamics among the states of the
union are a testament to federalism within the United States. Changes, tweaks, and

This stands as an interesting juxtaposition considering the Brennan Center advocates the use of the
Missouri Plan as a way to keep judges accountable at the polls.

nuances can be made, observed, and tested to fit the particular needs and dynamics of that

specific state. One such institution that experiences an extremely high level of variation

is the judicial system, specifically, the method of selection used to staff the courts of last
resort in the states.

While each state's method of selection has its own nuances and quirks, there are

largely five different methods which are used amongst the states to staff their highest
courts. These are partisan elections, non-partisan elections, retention elections,

gubernatorial appointments, and legislative appointments (Warrick 1993). States have
changed methods over time, and indeed, states such as North Carolina (Boniti 2011),
Nevada (German 2009), Tennessee (Locker 2009), Michigan (Gilber 2010), and
Wisconsin (Rafery 2011) are currently debating changes in their method ofjudicial
selection.

States which utilize partisan elections staff their high courts in a method which is
not dissimilar from that of elections for members of Congress. If there are challengers,

candidates must run in a partisan primary to win the party's endorsement, and then must

compete in the general election to win the position. The candidates in the general
election appear with their partisan identification on the ballot. These elections can be,
and often are, highly contested events, with large amounts of money spent in the
campaigns (Bonneau and Hall 2009). The partisan electoral system generally provides
the public with the most information in terms of candidates, whether before the election
in terms of campaigning (Bonneau and Hall 2009) or at the polls with their party
identification listed on the ballot (Klein and Baum 2001).

Non-partisan elections are quite similar to their partisan counterparts in structure.
Candidates must run in a primary and a general election. The significant modification

from partisan elections is that candidates in states which utilize non-partisan elections do

not have a party attachment listed on either the primary or general election ballot. While
partisan leanings are often easily observable, this leaves voters without a heuristic

shortcut in the voting booth. Non-partisan elections are generally viewed as lowerinformation, lower-cost affairs (Bonneau and Hall 2009) and, the ballot provides little
relevant information to the voters (Klein and Baum 2001). These elections still can be

contested, and the amount of money being spent in non-partisan elections has increased
significantly since the 1980s (Justice at Stake 2011).

The common conception of the Missouri Plan, also commonly known as retention
elections, have been described as "a process in which a non-partisan or bipartisan

commission nominates a few individuals for a judicial position, for appointment (usually)

by the executive based on the commission's recommended names, with subsequent
tenure on the bench dependent upon a retention election at specific intervals" (Hurwitz
and Lanier 2001, 86, fh. 11). While the Missouri Plan thus incorporates elements of both

appointive and electoral systems, the vast majority of judges subject to retention elections
are in fact retained (Hall 2001b), and thus the defining feature of these merit systems is

the initial nomination by commission (Hurwitz and Lanier 2001). In the perfect example
of a Missouri Plan state, such as Iowa, a non-partisan judicial nominating committee
recommends a list of individuals from which the governor chooses a nominee. The

justice, depending on the laws of the state, serves for a brief period of time ranging from
one to three years. Following this period of time the justice must stand for a retention

election. The retention election is simply an up or down vote from the public saying
either they approve, or disapprove of the justice. It is not a contested election, and as
such, generally less salient, with more ballot roll-off (Hall and Aspin 1987). Also, less
information is available to the public because of the lack of campaigning on the part of
the standing justices (Bonneau and Hall 2009). Designers of this system claim it
balances both accountability and independence, and while the system does shield the

justices from public accountability at the time of selection, it does subject them to public
confidence during retention.

The two remaining methods of selection, gubernatorial appointment and

legislative appointment, differ from the previous three because there is no chance for
public accountability concerning the justices. They do not stand in any election: partisan,

non-partisan, or retention. These states still exhibit accountability by the way in which

judges within the system are retained, but that accountability is not given a public outlet.
The gubernatorial appointment system is modeled in large part after the system

used to select judges in the federal system (Canon 1972), with modification by the use of
a judicial selection commission. In gubernatorial appointment systems the governor
selects from a list approved by a judicial nominating committee2 and is responsible for

retaining the sitting justices. While the ideology of the governor's office may change, the
governor is still highly likely to retain a previous colleague's judge, so as to avoid
appearing to being playing political games with the judicial branch. In no gubernatorial
appointment state is the nominating commission required by law, but it is included in the

" The nominating commission is a modern development, marking its inception to the use of the Missouri
Plan which as part of its institutional setup introduced the idea of non-partisan/bipartisan nominating
commissions.

informal process in every state. In legislative appointment systems, the legislature
chooses one judge from a list ofjudges determined by either the judicial committee or the
legislature as a whole. When judges' terms are up, the legislature takes an approval vote

to determine retention, though as with gubernatorial appointment systems, the majority
party has generally been unwilling to remove justices for ideological differences.

Legislative appointment occurs in only two states: Virginia and South Carolina.
History of Judicial Selection in the States

The reasons for the current debate over methods of judicial selection and the

variation of methods of selection amongst the states have their roots in the historical

political movements of the country, as well as regional nuances. As political movements
have changed over time, so have methods of judicial selection. Many states have
modified the method they have used over time, generally with the motivation of
subjecting justices to either more or less accountability.

Following the founding of the nation, the various states, as well as the federal
government, followed the lead of Great Britain in appointing their judges and giving
them life tenure. The appointing institution varied depending on the state, but all states
which entered the union until 1832 appointed their judges to the court of last resort. The

reasoning for this occurrence is summarized by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78.
Hamilton argued that the judiciary in its current state was not a powerful institution. It
was unable to enforce decisions, and as such, depended on the other two branches of

government to lend their strength in order for judgments to be carried out. Furthermore,
the assumption at the time was that because the judiciary was weak it would not handle
important political decisions. These decisions instead could be handled by the executive

and the legislature. As such, the need for oversight from the public or the other branches
in the form of term limits was assumed unnecessary (Streb 2007). The thirteen original

states all entered the union appointing their judges for lifetime terms. It was not until

Mississippi entered the union in 1832 that a court of last resort used any method except
appointment.

When Mississippi entered the union, their constitution required judges at every

level be popularly elected. Very quickly states began to adopt elections, primarily
partisan elections, as a means of selecting judges. According to Evan Haynes (1944), "In
the year 1850 alone, seven states changed to popular election of judges (p. 100)."
Following the conclusion of the Civil War, a majority of the states in the union, twentyfour of thirty-four, used elections as the way to staff their judiciary.

This push for the popular election ofjudges can be linked to numerous

contributing factors. First, following the publication of Marbury v. Madison (1803) and
the establishment ofjudicial review as the power of the judiciary, a worry emerged that
unaccountable judges would begin to overturn law in the states. By making judges

responsible to the same constituency as legislators, this concern could be mitigated.
Second, following on the heels of the Jacksonian Democrat revolution, it was thought at
the time that elections would actually make judges more independent than they were

previously. Under the system of appointment, the judges were thought to be beholden to
those that selected them, namely the governor or legislature. By removing their means of
selection out of the other two branches of government, judges were thought to be more
independent from those branches. Third, moving retention into the hands of the

electorate allowed a means by which to remove inept judges from the bench that did not
involve impeachment (Streb 2007).

This increase in partisan elections did not eliminate all issues concerning judicial
selection in the states. Partisan candidates were largely chosen by the dominant political
machines at the time. The move to elections, which was thought to increase

independence from the other branches of government, had created a system where the
judges were perceived as dependent on the political machines. During the Progressive
Era, in an attempt to curtail control by the political machinery of the time, non-partisan
elections were floated as a means to maintain public accountability, while insulating

judges from the perceived vulgarity of partisan politics and thus diminishing cronyism.
Candidates appear on the ballot with no partisan identification. These non-partisan
elections removed power from the political machinery at the time, allowing the public to
choose directly who would be the judges without the mitigating role of the party.

Beginning in the early 1900s, the AJS began the push for another method to select

judges. Initially termed merit selection, the system which is now used in sixteen states is
more commonly known as the Missouri Plan. The AJS argued that this method of
selection would shield candidates from politics because a list of candidates would arise

from a non-partisan/bipartisan commission from which the governor would select a

judge. These judges would remain accountable to the public because at the end of their
initial term (usually one to three years), they would have to stand for a retention election,
in which they would not face a challenger, but instead would be subjected to an up or
down vote from the electorate.

The current landscape ofjudicial selection in the various states exhibits a wide
range of variation, but the patterns that remain are, to a degree, holdovers from the

various political movements that occurred while states were admitted to the union. Table
1 contains the states and their current method of selection. Only four states utilize a pure

form of partisan elections: Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, and West Virginia. Alabama and

Louisiana changed their method of selection during the era of Jacksonian influence while
Texas and West Virginia were admitted to the union originally as partisan election states.
All four of the states have constitutionally mandated that elections be the primary means

of selecting judges, which likely explains why they have remained resistant to change,
given that constitutional amendment is exceedingly difficult.
Five states can be considered hybrid electoral states, in that they combine

mechanisms of the other four types within their method of selection. Illinois, New

Mexico, and Pennsylvania hold partisan elections for open seats and seats which are

filled by the governor in interim. Justices in these states then stand in an uncontested
retention election for successive terms. The states of Michigan and Ohio combine

portions of partisan and non-partisan elections in unique ways. In Michigan, candidates
are chosen in a private party caucus, yet appear on the general election ballot with no
affiliation listed. In Ohio, candidates must win a partisan primary to gain their party's
nomination, but must also appear on the general election ballot with no party
identification listed. In combining parts of partisan, non-partisan, and retention elections

as well as other unique arrangements these states are institutionally different from others
in the union.

8

Kentucky

12

West

6

Oklahoma

6
10

Wisconsin
8

10
8

Tennessee

Utah

Wyoming

Dakota

8

South

12

Virginia

10
6
Vermont

South Carolina

6

Oregon
Washington

Missouri
Nebraska

10
6

North Dakota

Life

Rhode Island

12

14

10

Life

New York

Maryland

8

North Carolina

8

5

6

Life

Massachusetts

7

10

New Hampshire
New Jersey

Maine

Hawaii

12

8

Length

Term

Kansas

Iowa

8

10

6

6

Indiana

Florida

Montana*

8

Mississippi

10

Nevada

6

Minnesota

Colorado

12

California

Delaware

Connecticut

Appointment

Pennsylvania**

Ohio***

New Mexico**

Michigan***

Illinois**

Hybrid Elections

10

6

8

8

10

Length

Term

Source: Data taken from http://www.judicialselection.us/, website administered by the American Judicature Society
* Retention elections held if incumbent is unopposed.
** Justices are initially chosen in partisan elections but in subsequent terms only stand for retention election.
*** During the general elections candidates appear without a party identification on the ballot, but they are initially chosen in a partisan manner (partisan
caucus/partisan primary).

Virginia

6

Idaho

6

Texas

10
6

Arizona

Alaska

8
6

Georgia

10

Arkansas

6

Alabama

Louisiana

Length

Plan

Length

Elections

Length

Elections

Term

Missouri

Term

Non-Partisan

Term

Partisan

Selection Systems for State Courts ofLast Resort, 2011

Table 1

Figure 1. Method of selection in U.S. states.
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The states which still use appointment systems are predominantly in the area of the
original thirteen states. In what resembles a path-dependent nature, the choices the states
originally made have proved relatively unchanged. Only three states retain life tenure for
their justices: Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, while the others have
adopted terms, which are themselves renewable.

States which use either non-partisan elections or the Missouri Plan are largely states

which changed their method of selection during the Progressive movement or entered the
union with these methods originally. While there appears to be no regional trend to states
which adopted the Missouri Plan, a large proportion of states which use non-partisan
elections come from the south and midwest regions.

Figure 2 breaks down the method of selection by the primary means by which justices are
chosen initially either by election or appointment. The states which are grouped into
elections include both partisan and non-partisan elections, including the hybrid systems

leaving states which use the Missouri Plan, gubernatorial appointment, or legislative

appointment to be grouped into the appointment category. Regionally, the northeast and
the Atlantic coast predominantly use some form of appointment system. Many of the

states in this region are using the same method of selection as they initially did at their
incorporation with minor modifications, usually in the form of tenure length. A block of
the central United States ranging from the midwest to the mountain west contains a large
number of appointment states universally using the Missouri Plan. Minus three states,
the South is a stronghold for elections, and the same can be said for the Northwest.
Overall, there is substantial regional variation in terms of the methods of selection used to
staff state courts of last resort.
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Current State of Judicial Selection

The push for states to change their method of judicial selection did not cease

following the Progressive Era. Indeed, the Brennan Center for Justice, the American Bar
Association, and the American Judicature Society all actively campaign for some form of

"merit" selection to be used in the states. Following an active campaign in the state of

Nevada, a state which uses non-partisan elections to staff their bench, the Missouri Plan

was brought before the voters of the state in 2010. Fifty-eight percent of the voters chose
to reject the purposed change in the states method of selection, mirroring defeats of

similar proposals in 1972 and 1988 (Skolnik 2007). Nevada is not the only state actively
debating changes to their method of selection. North Carolina's legislative Election

Oversight Committee has actively been debating moving to the Missouri Plan as well
(Boniti2011).

A possible reason for the continued push toward states adopting the Missouri Plan
are the changes, both real and perceived, that have occurred concerning judicial elections.
There is little doubt that in the past ten years profound changes have occurred with

respect to funding of judicial elections. According to Justice at Stake, campaign

spending has more than doubled injudicial elections from the 1990s to the 2000s, rising
from $83.3 million to $206.9 million (Justice at Stake 2010). According to many reports,

the tone of judicial elections has changed as well. Judicial elections historically had been
low salience affairs, marked with little money spent by the candidates and advertising

that was generally demure (Streb 2007). One commentator has famously noted that
"new" style judicial elections are, "noisier, nastier, and costlier" (Woodsbury 1988).
These claims are generally followed by the additional argument that judicial

15

independence is being eroded at the cost of public accountability at the polls (O'Connor
2010). These claims often are supported by anecdotal stories, or data for a single state or

election. These groups generally support their claims from a theoretical or normative
standpoint, rarely scientifically testing their claims.

The reform groups make numerous claims concerning the deleterious effects that
increased campaign spending has on the judiciary. Among their claims is that the

increased money spent in elections has lowered the legitimacy of the judiciary in the eyes
of the public. In the "New Politics of Judicial Elections 2000-2009," released by the
Brennan Center for Justice, the authors claim, "More than seven in ten Americans believe

that campaign contributions affect the outcome of courtroom decisions" (4, but see
Gibson et al. 2011). One of the most vocal opponents of judicial elections, ex-Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, has argued that the amount of money spent on

judicial elections has called into question the judicial independence of judges (O'Connor
2010). She contends that the increased spending by judicial candidates has caused an
erosion of public confidence in the courts. Outside of her concerns that the election of
judges reduces the consistency and predictability of the law, she claims that as

increasingly large amounts of money enter into judicial elections that judges may be
expected by their contributors to make decisions in a certain fashion, thereby eroding the
independence of the judges to rule solely based in the law. While these reform groups
make claims concerning the nature ofjudicial selection, many of their hypotheses have
been challenged by political science researchers.

16

Political Science of Judicial Selection

This history of political science literature on judicial selection notably follows the
same methodological evolution of political science literature more generally. Before the
behavioral revolution which occurred in the 1940s and 1950s, much of the work done by

political scientists on judicial selection examined the issue theoretically, supporting their
suppositions with anecdotes. Harold Laski is perhaps the earliest commentator from the
field of political science on judicial selection.

Laski (1926) wrote in opposition of every method of selection barring executive

selection (gubernatorial appointment) supplemented by a nominating commission staffed
by judges. While he does not address the Missouri Plan, he claims ofjudicial elections,
"Insofar as its underlying assumption is the belief that the people should choose those by
whom they are to be governed, it omits to note the vital fact that the qualifications for
judicial office are not such as an undifferentiated public can properly assess" (532).
Beyond dismissing the voting public as being unable to determine if a candidate for

judgeship is qualified for the position, he also argues that by making judges beholden to
an electorate, the institution will cause a train of thought concerning retaining their

position which should "be absent from the judicial mind (531)."
Laski also argues that legislative election simply makes the judges dependent on

the party in power, thereby reducing the judicial independence ofjudges. He claims that
the selection from a partisan body will devolve into a partisan process, and will not be
focused simply on the consideration of the various candidates' qualifications . Much of

3Laski goes so far as to argue thatremoving the U.S. Senate confirmation of federal judges would lead to a
more desirable system.
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the early work in political science took a form similar to the advocacy of the reform
groups: scant empirical backing and theoretical normative arguments.
Behavioral work on state courts however was a slow moving process. Following
the behavior revolution most of the research done injudicial politics examined the federal
courts, in particular, the U.S. Supreme Court. The nascent empirical work examining

state courts began to arise in the 1960s. The work in this area has been divided into three
distinct, though interrelated topics: judicial behavior, judicial independence, and voting in
judicial elections.
Judicial Behavior

Vines (1965) examined state litigation in civil rights cases from 1954-1963 in

southern states, which used judicial elections as a means to staff the bench. Vines found

that judges were extremely unlikely to rule for the rights claimant, and if the lower court
did find in favor of a rights violation, it was overturned on appeal over 90% of the time.
Vine claims that this could be because the judges were dependent on the voting public for
re-election. He continues by saying that judges who were insulated either by life tenure,
or a means of selection which did not involve elections, may have been more likely to
decide in favor of the civil rights claims. While this work is noteworthy for the time
considering the use of empirical data, Vines could not escape the problem of
observational equivalence, meaning he could not rule out other alternative explanations.
Hall (1987) examined if the institutional arrangements of the various methods of
selection might account for the low rate of dissent in state supreme courts. Her

hypothesis was that judges who serve in states where they must stand for re-election
should be less likely to dissent even when they disagree with the reasoning in the
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majority opinion, so as not to be perceived as out of step with the views of their
constituency. Examining the Louisiana Supreme Court, she found that liberal justices

were extremely unlikely to dissent in salient cases, specifically cases involving the death

penalty. In interviews, she found that the judges were appealing to their regional
constituencies despite their own moral and legal objections to the death penalty . In this
case study, Hall found that these judges were accountable to their districts.

Beginning largely in the 1990s, two researchers, Paul Brace and Melinda Gann

Hall, begin to drive the study of state courts of last resort with large N, quantitative
studies. These studies examining voting behavior mixed three different types of

explanations which had been prevalent in previous work; case-characteristic models,
preference models, and neo-institutional models.

In a broader study, quantitatively examining 48 states at three time points, Brace

and Hall (1990) found that dissent rates on state supreme courts varied predictably based

upon the states' institutional arrangements. In contrast to the findings of Hall (1987),
Brace and Hall found that judges in states which utilized appointment methods had

significantly more consensus than states which use elections. Brace and Hall explained
that the findings of the 1987 piece focused on a highly salient "easy" issue, the death

penalty. While highly salient issues may have an interactive effect with electoral systems
to produce high levels of consensus across all types of cases, appointment systems are
institutionally geared toward decreasing the level of dissent.

Hall (1992) examined more directly the effect of electoral systems on individual

justice behavior. Looking at four southern state supreme courts, Hall sought to find out if
Louisiana elects their Supreme Court justices based on regional districts.
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justices in the political minority, both on the Court and in the voting public, voted
strategically in order to increase their likelihood of re-election. In accordance with her

hypothesis, she finds that individuals who are institutionally predisposed to be vulnerable
during the election will modify their voting patterns to bring them more in equilibrium
with the Court and the views of their constituency. She argues that by engaging in this
behavior, the judges are acting in a representative fashion consistent with the desire to
maximize accountability in electoral systems.
Three articles from Brace and Hall (1993, 1995, 1997) examined the determinants

of vote choice on state courts of last resort. Combining personal attributes as well as
institutional and contextual variables, Brace and Hall found that the exercise of personal

preference in vote choice is conditioned by the institutional and contextual environment
in which the choices are made. As an example, Brace and Hall (1997) found that

individuals judges who are predisposed to vote liberally will be much more likely to
maintain a conservative voting record if they are in an electoral system with short terms.
This however can be mitigated if both the composition of the Court and the political
climate of the state are decidedly liberal. Ultimately, Brace and Hall found that it is the
institution, combined with the political context of the state, which conditions the
decisions of the judge.
Judicial Independence

Examining the politics of judicial selection in a state which uses the Missouri Plan
Watson, Downing, and Spiegel (1967) looked at the composition, and decisions of
nomination committees in Missouri. Despite the claims of reform groups that merit
selection plans such as those used in Missouri shield judges from politics, Watson et al.
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find that the decisions of the nominating commissions are actually partisan in nature.

Two rival organizations which populated these commissions served to represent their
constituents and clients instead of simply picking the most qualified candidate.
Studies by Glick and Vines (1969), Canon and Jaros (1970), Ungs and Baas
(1972), Cannon (1972), and Wold (1974) examined whether the role perceptions of

judges in state courts were affected by their method of selection. Mainly utilizing survey
analysis, these researchers came to some general conclusions. Judges who were elected
to the bench were more likely to claim they were mere interpreters of the law. Judges

who were shielded from elections, or had longer terms of office were more likely to claim
themselves to be law makers. While these studies were groundbreaking, they suffered

from a distinct lack of control variables, making it difficult to determine if the
correlations found were likely to be of a causal nature.
Voting in Judicial Elections

Beginning in the late 1970s, political scientists turned their gaze primarily from
the characteristics ofjudges to the methods by which they were selected. Dubios (1979)
began to look at the electoral institutions in both partisan and non-partisan elections
which selected members of state supreme courts. Looking to answer critics ofjudicial
elections, Dubios examined the relevance of voting cues, namely partisan identification
listed on the ballot. He found, as some critics had predicted, that, "Without a party cue,
voting decisions are relatively unstructured and, as examples show, often produce

idiosyncratic results (757)." In partisan judicial elections however, voters behaved very
much they would in other partisan elections. The party cues served to help voters make
rational decisions, voting consistently down party lines. While Dubios refused to enter
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the normative debate of whether it was better to maximize judicial accountability or

judicial independence, he conceded that if one wished to have a system which ensured
accountability at the polls, that partisan elections are the effective means by which to
accomplish this task.

Dubios (1979b) sought again to test another hypothesis ofjudicial reformers,
namely, that judicial elections suffered from low turnout. Examining all non-Southern
states which utilized either partisan, non-partisan, or retention elections from 1948 1974, Dubios found that low turnout was not a universal truth of all judicial elections,
and states which did have low voter turnout had institutions which increased that

probability. Dubios found that factors which depressed turnout in non-judicial elections

also produced low turnout in judicial elections. Factors including the timing ofjudicial
elections, partisan labels, and contestation all affect the amount of voter turnout and
ballot roll-off. Dubios recognizes that some of these selection systems inherently, as part
of their institutional construct, have these deficiencies ingrained. Partisan elections,
regardless of scheduling, experience low levels of ballot roll-off. Non-partisan elections
have significant scheduling effects, with higher ballot roll-off in presidential election
years. Non-partisan elections however suffer because candidates appear on the ballot
without a partisan identification, significant increasing their average level of ballot rolloff as compared to partisan elections. Retention elections have the most institutional
deficiencies. Retention races, by institutional construction, have no party identification
on the ballot, and no contestation. These elections suffer from a significant amount of

ballot roll-off, ranging from 25 to 50 points lower than states which use partisan
elections. Dubios (1979b) concluded, "The level of voting in state judicial elections is
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primarily a function of the institutional arrangements under which they are conducted and
does not reflect peculiar voter behavior in ballotings for this particular kind of elective

office (886)."
Two studies in 1983, both examining non-partisan judicial elections, examined

the effects of voting cues on voter behavior. Lovrich and Sheldon (1983) found that
voters (and would-be voters) in states which use non-partisan elections lack significant
cues in order to make informed decisions. In the absence of voter pamphlets and other

means to increase voter knowledge, this leads to lower voter turnout, and for those who
choose to vote, voter inconsistency. Dubios (1983), examining non-partisan trial court
races in California, found similar affects. He warned that, "At this point, the existing

research has demonstrated that not all judicial elections are alike and that the
accountability function of elections appears to be better served in some electoral
circumstances than others (433)."

Examining the decisions of voters can be difficult. Given the nature of state-bystate variation, it is difficult to statistically examine how the voters of one state will
behave under a different method of selection. Klein and Baum (2001) countered this

problem by imbedding an experiment into a pre- and post-election survey. By modifying
the vignette which participants saw, Klein and Baum were able to assess how voters

would behave under varying levels of ballot information. Klein and Baum found that the
only relevant information that affected not only the decision to vote, but also vote choice,

was the knowledge of the candidates' partisan identification. Giving the participants
additional or other types of information including incumbency or city of location had no
discernible effect. Klein and Baum concluded that non-partisan elections, with these
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institutional deficiencies built into the system, may not be able to serve the accountability
function that is expected from elections.

The research done in political science over the last ten years on state courts of last

resort can be grouped together largely by one common thread: testing the hypotheses of
judicial reformers, those groups and individuals which seek to end the practice of
selecting judges via elections. The work done in this vein can be separated into two
areas. One area seeks to test the reformers' hypothesis that judicial elections are low
salient affairs that do not serve an accountability function. The second area of research

probes manyof the claims concerning the nature of increasingly expensive judicial
campaigns.

Hall (2001a) addressed two interlinked claims put forth by reform groups. First,
she tested the assumption that partisan elections are ill-equipped to serve their
accountability function. Second, she examined the assumption that non-partisan and
retention elections are in some way shielded from politics. On both accounts, she found
the claims of the reformers dubious. Substantively, she found that, to varying degrees,
the election outcomes in each of the three methods of selection are a function of political
variables.

Hall (2001b) examined a different way in which to measure accountability. She

theorized that if judges are strategic, they would prefer to choose the way in which they
leave the bench. Under conditions where it appears they would likely lose the next

election, they should have an increased likelihood of retiring. Examining partisan, non

partisan, and retention elections, Hall concluded that, "In states that select judges using
partisan elections or the Missouri Plan, justices' decisions of whether to face voters or
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relinquish their seats are determined, at least in part, by factors in the external political
environment indicative of relative risk (1135)." She argued that the findings of this study
showed that reformers may be partially right and partially wrong. If partisan elections
were not serving their accountability function, then we would not expect to see strategic
retirement. Similarly, if retention elections did shield justices from politics, increasing
their judicial independence, we would not see them behaving in this strategic fashion.
Reformers may be correct, however, about the nature of non-partisan elections,
considering justices did not engage in strategic retirement.

Again, addressing the claims of numerous judicial reformers, Hall and Bonneau
(2006) took on interrelated concepts. To begin, Hall and Bonneau claimed that

challengers will be more likely to enter the race when the institutional and political
environment is tilted toward the probability of an incumbent's defeat. They found that the
same variables which predict challengers in congressional elections (previous close
election, an in-term appointment, and divided government) predict the likelihood a

challenger will enter the race. In the next stage of the model, they examined what affects
the incumbent vote share. The best predictors of the percentage of an incumbent's vote
are a quality challenger, if they were a new appointee, and the spending difference
between the candidates. Hall and Bonneau concluded that the claims that judicial

elections are not serving their accountability function are incorrect, as these elections
behave quite similarly to legislative elections in that candidates behave strategically and
the voting public can differentiate between weak and strong candidates.

In a related aspect, Hall (2007) founds that ballot roll-off is conditioned by the
method of selection and other environmental factors. The criticisms concerning the
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ambivalence of voters concerning judicial elections only applies to non-partisan and
retention elections, two of the systems which judicial reformers actually prefer. Similar to
what Dubios (1979b) found, Hall argued that the institutional deficiencies of retention
and non-partisan elections lead to increased ballot roll-off because the institutions fail to
provide the voters with useful heuristic cues.

The second aspect that modern political science research examines concerning
state courts of last resort is the effect that money has on judicial elections. Following the

claims of numerous judicial reform groups like the Brennan Center for Justice concerning
the nature of judicial election expenditure (Brennan Center 2011), numerous political
scientists have sought to examine the empirical relationship.
Bonneau (2004) asked a simple question: has the amount of money spent in

judicial elections actually increased from 1990 to 2000? Bonneau found that campaign
expenditure did actually increase, across both partisan and non-partisan elections. He
found that in some states, campaign expenditure has always been high, but all states had
seen a relative increase in both campaign expenditure and contested elections. Bonneau

(2005) found that campaign expenditures in states correlate with an increase in contested
and close elections. While Bonneau does not claim that it is a causal relationship, he

finds that campaign expenditure occurred with an increased number of contested and
close elections. Similarly, Bonneau (2007) found that the predictors of campaign
expenditure in state supreme court elections follow the traditional predictors of spending
in legislative elections, namely quality challenger, previous close race, and an incumbent
who has not previously stood for election. Hall and Bonneau (2008) found that the
increased campaign expenditure does not have negative effects on the accountability
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function of state supreme court elections. Higher levels of campaign expenditure resulted
in decreased ballot roll-off. Hall and Bonneau concluded, "the fact remains that

expensive campaigns serve to encourage participation in elections for the state high court

bench once those voters already have gone to the polls to cast ballots for other important
elections. In short, money means voters in supreme court elections (468)."
In Republican Party ofMinnesota v. White (2002), a divided 5-4 U.S. Supreme
Court struck down the announce clause, which prevented candidates for judicial office
from discussing possible issues that may come before them while in office. Groups like
the ABA and the American Judicature Society claimed that this would increase many of
the problems already associated with judicial elections. The Brennan Center for Justice
claimed, "What is therefore threatened is a comprehensive loss of public faith in the

capacity of elected judges to decide upon the most important legal issues of the day in a
manner faithful to the adjudicative ideas of fairness and impartiality (2002)." With the
publication ofRunning for Judges: The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal Stakes of
Judicial Elections more scholarly attention turned to the fallout (or perceived fallout)

from the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in the case Republican Party ofMinnesota v.
White (2002). Many of the chapters focused on the empirical occurrences following the

decisions. A general consensus of the book was that something had changed, be it either
the tone of the elections (Caufield 2007), interest group participation (Goldberg 2007), or
the amount of campaign spending (Bonneau 2007). All of these scholars however were
quick to note that only a small amount of time had passed following the White decisions,
and that their conclusions should be understood in that context.
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For years following the publication of Runningfor Judges, Bonneau, Hall, and
Streb (2011) questioned if any substantive, empirical change had occurred injudicial
elections following the White decision. They state that their "primary assumption is that
if White has had the transformative effects generally presumed to have occurred, we
should see measurable changes in key characteristics of these races (249)." Using
ANOVA, the authors examined five areas (contestation, quality challengers, incumbent

vote share, campaign spending, and ballot roll-off) to determine if any statistically

significant changes had occurred following the White decisions. Bonneau et al. found
that there were no statistical differences post-White. Despite the claims of many reform

and advocacy groups, the decision turned out to be the dog that did not bite.

Over the past 50 years, the empirical work done by political scientists has

extensively increased our knowledge of state courts of last resort. Much of the research
done during this time period was focused on testing hypotheses which were derived from
the normative statements concerning judicial selection mechanisms stated by groups

interested in ceasing judicial elections. This research has increased our knowledge

significantly. We know a significant amount about how incumbents fare in judicial
elections, how voters behave injudicial elections, and how judges' decisions are

influenced by their method of selection, though currently, we know precious little about
the determinants of judicial careers. The different types of selection and retention systems
serve as important intervening institutions, which may have predictable effects on judicial
tenure. It is unlikely that on average judges in partisan electoral systems have similar
career lengths to those judges serving in Missouri Plan systems. There are sound
theoretical reasons to assume these varying institutions ofjudicial selection should have
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observable effects on the individuals who serve as judges. These institutions are created
to distribute risks of removal differently. Said more simply, the methods of selection
make it easier or harder to remove judges from their office, and as such, we should expect

the careers ofjudges within these different systems to be affected systematically.
Plan for this Dissertation

In the course of this dissertation I will examine three specific claims made by

judicial reform groups concerning the effects different methods of selection should have
on judicial careers. Using quantitative data on 18 states concerning justice tenure from

1980 to 2005,1 will employ an event history approach to examine what affects judicial
tenure under a variety of institutional and political stimuli. States were chosen randomly
from lists which were separated by type of selection system. I decided to end the analysis
in 2005 because of the nature of retention cycles in the various states. Some states retain
their justices as often as four years, while others wait as long as twelve. By ending the

analysis at 2005,1 was able to stop at a point where complete records were available.
In Chapter III will apply the claims of both the reformers and election advocates
to a rational choice model, which takes into account the institutional variations that litter

the landscape of state courts of last resort. Those who debate the merits of one type of
selection system or another all claim that the specific institution, be it partisan election,

non-partisan election, retention election, gubernatorial appointment, or legislative
election condition judges' environments and thus behavior. In this chapter I will
formulate the theoretical motivation behind each of my empirical chapters. These
theoretical models will utilize basic rational choice theory, taking into account the
varying institutional arrangements, to determine the goal of the institutional designers,
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and ultimately, how justices in those systems should behave. I assume that under each of
the conditions examined in following chapters, either the institutional designers or the

justices themselves have a goal they are attempting to maximize.
The third chapter will examine if the expectations of the institutional designers

directly translate into empirical differences between the tenure rates for each selection
system. The primary hypothesis for this chapter states that each method of selection

distributes varying amounts of risk, which is directly relatable to varying amounts of

independence and accountability. Partisan elections, with normally high contestation
rates and partisan identification listed on the ballot should distribute the most risk, and
thus be the most accountable. Non-partisan elections, which are similar institutions to

partisan elections, except candidates do not appear on the ballot with a party
identification, should be the second most accountable. According to judicial reform

groups, the third most accountable should be the Missouri Plan, because while they do
not have contested elections they still subject the candidate to a yes or no vote by the
electorate. The least accountable, according to the judicial reformers, should be the

gubernatorial appointments and legislative election, as the judges only must be retained
by either selection body

The fourth chapter examines the relationship between campaign spending and

judicial tenure in partisan and non-partisan elections. Reform groups claimthat there is
an unquestionable link between increased campaign spending and a reduction of judicial
independence. The hypothesis for the second empirical chapter comes from these claims.
As I argue in Chapter III, judicial independence and accountability can be traced on a

linear path: when one increases the other must decrease. If the reformers are correct, and
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campaign funding decreases independence, then accountability must increase. If

increasingly higher levels of money are being spent injudicial campaigns, thus reducing
judicial independence, then these reform groups are also claiming that the judges are
more accountable than previously. The relationship being espoused is that the more
money spent, the shorter the judicial career. The single hypothesis under examination is
thus: the higher the total amount spent by the candidates injudicial elections, the shorter
judicial tenure rates will be.

The fifth chapter will attempt to determine whether or not state supreme court
justices engage in strategic behavior when leaving the bench. In this chapter the methods

of selection will be aggregated into two groups. These two groups will be based upon the
strategic ways an individual can leave the bench. Group one consists ofjudges in

systems of gubernatorial appointments, legislative elections, or retention elections.
Individuals in these selection systems can only retire strategically by leaving office when
the body that chooses their successor is ideologically congruent with themselves. While
judicial nominating commissions can play an intervening roll in the process, the final
decision remains either in the hands of the governor or legislature. Group two consists of
judges in partisan and non-partisan elections. These individuals can only retire
strategically by leaving office when a likely electoral defeat is approaching. These
individuals should be more likely to retire rather than risk electoral defeat. Hall (2001)
found that individuals in partisan and non-partisan elections retire strategically, but that
those in retention elections did not. She however assumed that judges in merit systems

would retire when they previously had a close retention election. That is, despite the
media attention surrounding the retention elections in Iowa in 2010, in which several
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justices failed to retain their seats on the bench, the reality is that sitting justices run an
extremely low risk of electoral defeat in retention elections (Hall 2001b). Judges know
this, and will continue to stay office until they wish to retire. Their likelihood of
retirement should increase when the governor is of the same party as the judge.
In the final chapter I will place my findings within the context of the claims made
by the reform groups. I plan on showing empirically whether or not the claims made by
reformist groups are correct. First, I will discuss whether or not retention elections are
accountable institutions. Second, I will examine whether high levels of campaign

funding in judicial elections restrict judicial independence. Lastly, I will analyze how
judges, regardless of method of selection, engage in strategic behavior with respect to
their retirement.
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CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

The nature of the variation in the methods of selection used to populate the state
courts of last resort has led both amateur and academic institutional designers alike to
make numerous claims concerning the nature that the institutions may have on justices
within them. Individuals on either side of the debate concerning which type of selection
system is normatively superior generally agree on one thing: institutions condition
individual behavior. The theoretical motivation from this dissertation follows from this

assumption. The variation of methods of selection and retention used in the American

states should have measurable effects on justices serving in state courts of last resort.
The assumption that formal and informal institutions have the ability to shape
individual level behavior arises from the assumption that individuals are rational actors.

Rational choice theory articulates a claim that individuals have goals and that these

individuals have an inherent rank ordering system for these goals. The pursuit of these
goals is accomplished via a cost-benefit analysis through which the individual will not act
if the intrinsic and economic value of the goal is less than the cost of the attempt to
acquire it (Friedman 1996). Perhaps the best-known example of rational choice theory as
applied to political science comes in the form of Down's (1957) An Economic Theory of
Democracy.

The theory of neoinstitutionalism builds upon rational choice theory by

recognizing that institutions are often interveners in strategic calculations.
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Neoinstitutionalism claims that, "political outcomes...result from actors' seeking to

realize their goals, choosing within and possibly shaping a given set of institutional

arrangements, and so choosing within a given historical context" (Aldrich 1995, 6: citing
Rohde and Shepsle 1978). Indeed, an entire sub-field of political science, Institutional

Design, was founded on the premise that carefully designed institutions can increase the
likelihood of democratic consolidation (Goodin 1996). While not all institutional

analysis follows a quantitative methodology, my research falls firmly within the "first

camp" of new institutional research as described by Gillman and Clayton (1999) as I seek
a rational choice explanation of individual behavior given the constraints of the
institution by examining the available data.

My dissertation takes this institutional approach because I claim that the differing
outcomes concerning tenure length ofjustices is caused in part by the systems their
crafters chose. This institutional perspective recognizes that judges will engage in a
rational choice, attempting to maximize their goals, within an institutional environment

that conditions certain types of behavior. Research demonstrates there are no identifiable
differences between justices that serve in systems staffed by elections or appointments

(Choi, Gullati, and Posner 2009). The nature of the judicial selection and retention
methods in the state vary drastically, allowing us to examine how similar justices will
behave under vastly different institutions.

Examining the historical evolution of the method of selections used in the states,
we recognize that an important consideration of each institutional innovation was the
expected effects they would have upon the individuals serving within them. Following
the founding of the nation, the states uniformly chose some form of appointment, either
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gubernatorial or legislative, because they thought it would keep judges free from "overt
political influence" (Streb 8, 2007). Beginning in the 1830s, and expanding during the
era of Jacksonian democracy, states increasingly began to move their judiciaries to

partisan elections. Bonneau and Hall (2009) argued this move to elections occurred
because of three reasons. First, the with increase of state supreme courts invalidating

laws via judicial review, institutional designers wanted to increase the relative
accountability of the judiciary, making judges more directly accountable for their

decision-making. Second, by removing the means of selection from the political
establishment, it was though the judges would be more independent from the legislature,
instead gaining their legitimacy from voters. Finally, it was viewed as a better way to

remove incompetent judges than was impeachment, which was rarely invoked by
legislatures because of the high political costs of such action.

The introduction of judicial elections however, "introduced a whole new set of

problems" (Streb 9, 2007). Partisan elections of the time were controlled by party
machines and thus, dominated by cronyism. Ultimately, while electing judges garnered
them independence from both the governor and legislature, it simply shifted their

dependence to another political institution, the party machinery of the era. Two reforms
emerged from the Progressive Era as possible solutions to the perceived vulgarities of
partisan elections. First, the American Bar Association and the progressives argued for
the non-partisan elections. By removing the control of the parties, it was believed that
judges in these systems would be more independent from the institutions of government
and the party machines. The second reform was sponsored in large part by the American
Judicature Society (AJS). The Missouri Plan, also known as merit selection, which
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combines retention elections, following nomination by a governor, were seen as a way to

maintain judicial independence from the party machinery while keeping public

accountability via an uncontested election. The history ofjudicial selections in the states
is based on the recognition by institutional designers that different types of selection

methods institutions can, to varying degrees, either increase or decrease both judicial
independence and judicial accountability.

Indeed, when the reform group the American Judicature Society currently argues

that, "[Njot only does merit selection ensure that only the most qualified candidates

become judges, but it also limits the influence of any one political party or public official.
In doing so, it frees judges from overt political influence and promotes a fair and
impartial judiciary" (AJS 2010), they are describing a situation in which they expect
merit selection to shield the judges from the political consequences of elections. They

continue, saying "Furthermore, retention elections provide a mechanism whereby those

judges who are failing to live up to their responsibilities to the citizens can be removed
from the bench. Unlike popular elections or appointment, merit selection seeks to balance

judicial independence (by removing - as much as possible - direct political control over

judges) with public accountability (by allowing citizens to decide whether the judge is
retained in office)" (AJS 2010), ultimately describing an institutional situation by which
the method of selection and retention causes a condition to exist that the AJS seeks to

promote, a balance of independence and accountability.

I begin from the theoretical assumption, identical to those institutional designers
of judicial selection mechanisms, that certain methods of selection do indeed affect
individual behavior. All justices, working within these various institutions, seeking to
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gain similar goals, will have their effort channeled and conditioned in different ways
dependent upon the method of selection and retention. The three following chapters

empirically test claims made by judicial reformers concerning the nature of conditioned
behavior within each of these institutions.

Does Accountability Vary?

Discussions concerning the implications of which method of selection should be

used to populate state courts of last resort generally focus on normative ideals. Central to
the these discussions concerning the variety of institutions used for judicial selection
within the United States comes a concern over whether judges should be, to varying

degrees, either accountable or independent (see Bonneau and Hall 2009, AJS 2010).

Understandably, this rhetoric delves succinctly into expectations regarding the nature of
judges and the judicial enterprise

Thus, arguments on the subject of various means ofjudicial selection, as well as
those regarding judicial behavior more generally, have a long tradition in the United
States. To state there is a controversy regarding methods of judicial selection in the states

would downplaythe current policy landscape, in terms of both numbers of players and
the level of rhetoric. A critical reason for the intensity of this debate is that judicial

selection systems play directly into the normative issue of whether judges should be
independent or accountable. Hamilton and the founders of the Constitution favored

judicial independence, a position more recently and strongly articulated by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor (2010). Yet, accountability via political participation is often claimed to
be essential to all democratic institutions (Bonneau and Hall 2009; Hall 2001a). Indeed,
there is much at stake when it comes to the method of selection and retention each state
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chooses for its judiciary. Consequently, the debate from both sides is heated. While the
AJS has recently acknowledged the validity of much of the work done by political
scientists (Judicature 2010), the normative debate concerning systems either promoting
independence or accountability still remains.

Empirically, there are five types ofjudicial selection systems used within the
United States: partisan elections, non-partisan elections, gubernatorial appointment,

legislative appointment, and the Missouri Plan. While some states combine certain

methods together (e.g., Pennsylvania uses partisan elections for open seats and then retain
their justices via retention elections, which are normally found in states that use the
Missouri Plan), these five types are easily identifiable and categorized, as they have
institutional differences which exist to levy more or less risk of removal upon the
justices.

I assume that the institutional designers of each of the selection systems have as

one of their goals to set the amount of risk of removal ingrained in each system. To this
end, they choose a system based on how much accountability they desire within the

judicial branch, understanding that the less accountable an institution is, the more
independent it is.
Accountability

Independence

Figure 3. Accountability vs. independence.

Figure 3 is a representation of a common way in which reform groups claim to
conceptualize accountability and judicial independence in modern politics. This is not to
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say that judicial independence and accountability are unidimensional concepts. There are
conceptions of both independence and accountability which do not easily fall into the
conceptualization. As an example, a judge in a system which has lifetime tenure can still

take into account public opinion and be simultaneously less independent and more
accountable and yet never encounter an election (Mishler and Sheehan 1996). However,

the way in which the reform groups have cast the debate, they make the underlying
assumption that more of one begets less of the other. A judge on the left-hand side of the
figure would be completely accountable, possibly removable after every decision the
court handed down. A judge on the right-hand side would be entirely independent with

lifetime tenure and no ability to be removed until retirement or death. Clearly these two
extremes do not exist within the American context, either at the state or federal level, but

they provide a starting point for discussion.

States deciding on a partisan election system for their judges should recognize
they will be choosing a system which generally provides the public with the most
information about candidates, whether it be before the election in terms of campaigning

(Bonneau and Hall 2009) or at the polls with their party identification listed on the ballot
(Klein and Baum 2001). This amounts to an increasing amount of risk of removal for the
judges, which increases their relative accountability. States that choose a non-partisan
electoral system for their judges choose a similar method to partisan elections, being that
both are ultimately the direct expressions of public will. Non-partisan elections are
believed to have less inherent risk than partisan elections, because they are generally
lower-information, lower-cost affairs (Bonneau and Hall 2009), and the ballot provides
little relevant information to the voters (Klein and Baum 2001). Theoretically, this
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should make non-partisan systems less accountable than partisan elections. Non-partisan
electoral systems, however, do subject the judges to competitive elections, which should
make them more accountable than either the Missouri Plan or appointment systems.

The Missouri Plan, according to judicial reform groups such as the American
Judicature Society, offers a balance between accountability and independence. In the
perfect example of a Missouri Plan system, such as Iowa, a non-partisan judicial

nominating committee recommends a list of individuals from which the governor chooses
one to nominate. The justice, depending on the laws of the state, serves for a brief period
of time ranging from one to three years. Following this period of time the justice must
stand for a retention election. The retention election is simply an up or down vote from

the public saying either they approve, or disapprove of the justice. It is not a contested
election, and as such, generally less salient, with more ballot roll-off (Hall and Aspin
1987) and less information available to the public because of the lack of campaigning on

the part of the standing justices (Bonneau and Hall 2009). Designers of this system claim
it balances both accountability and independence, and while the system does shield the

justices from public accountability at the time of selection, it does subject them to public
confidence during retention. As such, the designers expect their system to be less
accountable than any system that uses contested elections, but more accountable than
appointment systems.

There are two different types of appointment systems, both of which protect their
justices equally from the pressure of public sentiment. In gubernatorial appointment
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systems, the governor selects from a list approved by a judicial nominating committee5
and is also responsible for retaining the sitting justices. While the ideology of the
governor's office may change, the governor is still highly likely to retain a previous

colleague's judge, so as to avoid appearing to being playing political games with the
judicial branch. In legislative election systems, the legislature chooses one judge from a

list ofjudges determined by either the judicial committee or the legislature as a whole.
When judges' terms are up, the legislature takes an approval vote to determine retention,
though as with gubernatorial appointment systems, the majority party has generally been

unwilling to remove justices for ideological differences. With both of these appointment
systems, the designers shielded the justices almost entirely from electoral politics, by
removing not only their nomination but also their retention from the hands of public will.

As such, the designers intended to maximize judicial independence over accountability.
Accountability

Partisan

Independence

NPartisan

Missouri

Appointment

Figure 4. Designer's conception of accountability and independence as applied to
methods of selection.

Figure 4 displays the choices the institutional designers made based upon their
desire to distribute risk differently to their justices. These designers, attempting to

balance their goals of either maximizing independence or accountability, chose one of
these various systems precisely for the way in which they would affect the justices.

Though not all states which utilize gubernatorial appointments are legally required to use a nominating
commission, they are de facto used in all states.
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Based upon their choices, each of these methods of selection should have predictable
effects on the justices' term lengths, stemming directly from the goals of the designers.
Indeed, these assumptions are not merely semantics, but they dovetail with the

current public debate going on in numerous states concerning potential changes to their
judicial selection mechanism. Debates in states such as South Carolina (Boniti 2011),
Nevada (German 2009), Tennessee (Locker 2009), Michigan (Gilber 2010), and

Wisconsin (Raftery 2011) are invoking similar language and assumptions when trying to
determine which method of selection would be most preferred. These debates however,

are not fully articulated, missing important causal variables which may augment their
hypotheses' effects.

Any theory that attempts to explain why different systems have more or less
accountability needs to incorporate that risk varies not only across systems, but within

systems as well. Systems that subject judges to a selection/retention process which
involves the public, either through contested elections or retention elections, need to take
into account the effect of the salience of a contest on risk. Partisan and non-partisan

elections can either be low- or high-salience affairs. When justices go unchallenged,
these elections will be at their lowest salience; indeed, even at less risk than justices in

appointment systems. Contested elections, at their minimum, have a challenger, and

campaigning is likely to occur. Candidates in these elections would be at more risk of
losing than individuals who go unchallenged. These elections then should be higher
salience, and as such incumbents will be at a higher risk of departing the bench.
Retention elections are never contested, and as such will have lower salience, and thus

less risk. The amount of money spent during an election however, modifies the level of
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salience, and theoretically, should introduce more risk to the individual election

(Bonneau 2007). This occurrence explains retention elections in which an individual

justice is removed. Looking at Iowa in 2010, many organizations including the National

Organization for Marriage and the American Family Association spent over $3 million to
defeat three justices at the polls. This, according to the Brennan Center for Justice, was
more than was spent in the previous decade concerning retention elections in Iowa

(Sulzberger 2010). This increased the salience, and thus the risk, in the individual
election. It is important to note, that this occurrence was a rarity, not only in Iowa, but

among all states which use retention elections. Partisan and non-partisan election states
often have their justices in contested elections, and these elections are often well funded,
providing the public with a significant amount of information, raising the salience of the
event6.

Appointment systems such as legislative election and gubernatorial appointment

systems also fit within this saliency theory. It has become common rhetoric for

researchers of judicial selection to state that these systems are less accountable than merit
selection (which includes a public statement of will); this does not take into account the

individuals who are taking part in the selection or retention. The individuals in charge of
the appointment and retention process are political elites, and will be more attuned to the
behavior of the Supreme Court as opposed to the regular voting public. This increases
accountability, as the individuals who are charged with judicial oversight are those in
charge ofjudicial retention. Indeed, Langer (2002) argued that in appointment systems

Partisan elections generally experience higher amounts of campaign funding than non-partisan elections
(Bonneau and Hall 2009).
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the body charged with reappointment (governor or legislature) is quite aware of how the
justices has ruled on their legislation and policy actions. This makes the selection or
retention of a judge always a salient event. However, the elites in these systems

generally approve retention, as justices in these systems rarely operate outside of what

Langer terms the "safety zone."7 This means most justices in appointment systems will
not engage injudicial review or check the legislative output of the current government.
Thus, while mitigating their likelihood to remove a judge, the institutional arrangement
should be more accountable on average, because the individuals who are empowered
with choice are knowledgeable about the judge.

Unlike the theory espoused by reformers, my theory claims that merit systems
should be less accountable institutions on average when compared to appointment

systems. To be removed from the bench in states which use the merit system, a judge
will have to have a highly salient election. Considering the nature of the election, which
lacks contestation, this is an extremely unlikely event. Salient retention elections only
occur rarely when the public is energized via spending. Selections in appointment

systems are always salient, though mitigated by political implications. I hypothesize, as
seen in Figure 5, that the selection system of the Missouri Plan will exhibit the least
accountability, different from the claims of the judicial reformers. Judicial reform groups
such as the AJS and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System

(IAALS) maintain that "merit selection" is the best way to select judges. To the IAALS,

7While in recent years, some governors have rattled their swords, only one, Gov. Chris Christie (NJ) has
acted upon his threats. In 2010 Christie chose to not retain Justice Roberto Rivera-Soto.
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merit selection includes all systems that promote "quality" on the bench, including
gubernatorial or legislative appointment, and the Missouri Plan (IAALS 2006).

Accountability

Independence

Partisan

NPartisan Appointment Missouri

Figure 5. Theoretical conception of accountability and independence as applied to
methods of selection.

Both the AJS and IAALS argue that the Missouri Plan is the most accountable of
the three, as it contains a retention election which puts incumbent judges before the

populace. This differs significantly from my claim, as I recognize that retention elections

are rarely salient events. Retention elections thus, normally feature a non-energized,

uninformed populace, who often engage in significant amounts of ballot roll-off, shirking
their accountability function (Klein and Baum 2001).

Does Campaign Expenditure Affect Judicial Tenure?

While it is difficult to exactly determine what has changed with regard to judicial
elections in the states, it is clear to all observers that judicial elections have transformed
in some way. The most frequently cited changes regarding judicial elections in the past

twenty years regard the amount of money being spent and the tone. According to Justice
at Stake (2010), spending in judicial campaigns more than doubled from the 1990s to the
2000s, topping out at over $205 million. In one notable electoral contest in Wisconsin in
2008, almost $6 million dollars were raised by the incumbent and challenger combined
(Kourlis 2009). Most commentators claim that the change in tone coincides with the
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change in increased campaign spending. The Defense Research Institute (2001) goes so
far as to draw a direct causal link: "The tone, tenor and manner of judicial campaigns
have materially changed as special interest money and advertising have flowed into
judicial campaigns" (16).

The decreasing amount ofjudicial independence in state courts of last resort

which are selected and retained by judicial elections is one of the clarion calls ofjudicial
reform groups. The Committee for Economic Development (2011), advocates of the
Missouri Plan claim,

Where judges hold or retain office by election, the independence of the judiciary
is at risk. Elections encourage judges to raise campaign contributions and appeal to

voters. They provide special interests with substantial opportunities to politicize judicial
decisions and influence judicial behavior. Elected judges find it hard to avoid becoming

entangled in the political thicket. Selection by election does not befit the role of a judge
in our legal process. (1)

One of the reasons for this perceived reduction injudicial independence is the

claim that increased spending can influence an uninformed electorate. These groups

argue that with increased money being spent in judicial elections, judicial accountability
is being maximized at the cost of judicial independence. The Defense Research Institute
(2011) states,

Increased spending and fundraising activities targeting state judicial elections
have been working in tandem with heightened voter apathy and a lack of information

about judicial candidates. The confluence of these trends means that states that elect their
judges are especially vulnerable to the unique ability of political action committees and
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ideological groups to influence voters who lack the information necessary to properly

evaluate the influx of messages about judges running for election or retention. (15)
Contested elections by their nature put justices within these systems at more risk

of not being retained than other methods ofjudicial selection (Curry and Hurwitz 2010),
though it is not mere contestation, which reform groups are claiming is causing a
reduction in judicial independence. The argument they are making is that as increasing
amounts of money are being spent injudicial campaigns these campaigns are getting
closer, and the incumbent judges have an increasing likelihood to be removed from

office. Implicitly, these groups are claiming that as campaign spending increases, judges
experience a reduction in judicial independence at the cost ofjudicial accountability at
the polls. Figure 6 is the graphical representation of the reformers causal argument.

Accountability

Independence

As Spending Increases

Figure 6. Reformers' claims concerning campaign expenditure.

Theoretically, as campaigns get more expensive, according to reform groups, we
should notice a marked decrease in the length ofjudicial careers. Stated differently, more
expensive judicial campaigns should cause more overturn in the judicial office. Indeed,

according to another advocate for the Missouri Plan, "The increase in money and
organized interest, particularly business interest, has paved the way for more contentious
judicial elections" (Caufield 2007). The Center for Economic Development echoes this

47

sentiment, stating, "... transformation has taken place injudicial elections, resulting in
costlier, more competitive, and more controversial campaigns."
It could be that as money flows into these electoral races it increases the inherent

risk of removal that already exists within these methods of selection. Certainly there is
evidence that spending differences between the incumbent and challenger have an effect
on electoral success (Bonneau and Hall 2009). Bonneau and Hall (2009) found that the

differences between incumbent and challenger spending translated directly into
differences in vote shares. However, while Bonneau and Hall's research focused on

electoral success, my research question looks at judicial careers. By examining the
question of whether campaign spending affects judicial careers over time, I will be able
to address whether higher levels of campaign spending are affecting judicial

independence as argued by the reformers. As such, in Chapter IV I subject these claims

of the reformers to empirical scrutiny to determine if indeed, increasing amounts of
campaign spending have reduced judicial tenure in states with popularly elected justices.
Strategic Retirements of Elected and Appointed Justices

The decision to retire from any job usually involves considering numerous factors

for the average individual. Retirement plans, age, and working conditions are all possible
parts of the calculation individuals make when deciding whether to retire. While state

supreme court justices are generally far from the average citizen, it would seem plausible
that they would also consider numerous factors when making their decision to retire.
These decisions to retire, however, are not devoid of institutional context. Given the

nature and variation of the institutions ofjudicial selection and retention amongst the
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states, justices could theoretically be retiring for different reasons and with different
motivations.

The various types of methods of selection and retention used in state courts of last

resort were created in part to (AJS 2011), and have been shown to (Bonneau and Hall
2008) condition individual behavior, especially with regard to decisions on the merits of

cases. I hypothesize that these institutions of selection and retention also condition other
types of behavior, including that of retirement.

It seems ubiquitous to say that in political science there is a consensus that judges,

especially those in courts of last resort, decide cases at least in part based on their

personal preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2002). Justices, however, cannot remain in office
forever. The decision to terminate their tenure should likely take into account wishing to

see their ideological proclivities remain on the bench after their departure. In the federal

judicial system, the method of selection allows for the forward-looking justice or judge to
make a calculation concerning the probability of an ideologically congruent successor.
The federal method of selection, which consists formally of nomination by the president

and confirmation by the Senate, allows those judges seeking to retire the ability to
estimate the likelihood that the president in power will choose someone who will decide

cases like they had. To state more simply, the ideologically conservative judges know
that the likelihood of a conservative replacement significantly decreases when the office
of the presidency is occupied by a democrat (Hagle 1993).

While most justices in state courts of last resort do not have effective life tenure,

many are selected (and retained) in a way which increases their probability of being able
to predict the ideological tendencies of their successor. Justices who serve in systems
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which are populated by either gubernatorial appointment or legislative appointment know

the ideological composition of the individual or body who will select their replacement.
These justices, however, have an intervening step within the process, that of retention.
Justices in these states serve for set terms, and must be retained by the same institution
that initially selected them.

I argue that retention within these systems does not act as a significant motivator

for retirement behavior. Langer (2002) described a situation in which most justices will
behave in a manner consistent with what she termed the "safety zone." While justices are

operating within this zone, they have a low (approaching zero) probability of retaliation

when seeking retention. Examining the possibility of judicial review, Langer argued that

justices in appointment systems have a much smaller safety zone than justices in electoral
systems because these justices must take into account that another institution of
government, not the electorate, is responsible for their retention. She found evidence

that justices in systems that have an appointment mechanism for judicial retention will be
less willing to engage injudicial review. Indeed, Langer (2002, 37) claimed, "justices are
concerned about retaliation and that each branch of government pays attention to the

policy preferences of the other." Thus, she described an institutional situation where
judicial behavior will be affected because of the nature of retention. However,

simultaneously, she showed that justices will fear reprisal enough to behave in a fashion
that will increase their likelihood of being retained. As such, justices should decide cases
in a fashion that is consistent with the wishes of the party in power of the institution

responsible for their retention, which will make retention a nominal consideration when
deciding when to retire. An incumbent Supreme Court justice, who is a Democrat, would
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be much less likely to vote to overturn legislation passed by a Republican state
legislature.

Nominating commissions may have an intervening role to play in the selection

process in appointment states. Fitzpatrick (2009), expanding on the work of Watson,

Downing, and Spiegel (1967) demonstrated that the nominating commissions in Missouri
Plan states, were not representative of the population of that state, but instead the bar
association of that state. This leads to an ideological majority in these commissions,

which as Fitzpatrick demonstrated, has the tendency to nominate individuals who are

more ideological (often in a liberal direction) than the electorate. Considering the
function of nominating commissions, it is unlikely this will affect the strategic

calculations of justices wishing to retire. These commissions in most states submit a list
to the governor ranging from three to five individuals from which the governor must
choose. The nature of the list allows the governor to choose the individual who is closest

to their preference. The choice of the governor will not likely be at their ideal point, as
the institution conditions their choices, but if we assume an ideological motivation to the

section of judges, the governor will likely choose the most similar. A justice retiring,

having knowledge of the selection system intimately will recognize that their chances of
being replaced by an individual of close ideological proximity should increase
dramatically under an ideologically congruent governor. The same argument can be
made for the occurrence of divided government.

The calculations forjudges in electoral systems are markedly different from either

judges in the federal system or judges in states that use an appointment method. These
judges are not responsible for their decisions to another branch of government, but
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instead must answer to the public in elections. This institutional difference should

modify the strategic decision of when to retire from the bench, as the situation makes it
difficult to predict with any certainty the ideological nature of their replacement. The

outcomes of judicial elections are dependent on a number of factors, entirely out of the
controlof the retiring incumbent (Bonneau 2007). Therefore, since the institution of
retention in electoral systems removes the possibility of predicting the ideological nature

of their replacement, a different strategic calculation must takes its place.
Following the lead of Hall (2001), I hypothesize that since these justices most-

preferred preference, which is seeing someone ideologically similar replace them, is
prevented by the method of selection and retention, they will attempt to maximize a
second preference. Hall (2001) argued thatjustices in electoral states will have an

increasing probability of retirement when they fear a likely electoral defeat. Brace (1985)
hypothesized that the cost of running in a political campaign where defeat is probable is
less desirable than simply retiring. Losing an election carries a stigma, which further
would increase the cost of losing an election. Therefore, justices who fear likely defeat in
the next election should be more likely to retire than risk the stigmatization and cost that
comes with defeat at the polls .

Electoral systems almost universally however allow governors to fill seats vacated

by mid-term retirements. The justices chosen in this way have to stand for election
during the next cycle. This means that at most, a retiring justice can guarantee securing a
partisan replacement for ten months, though longer if they win election. Given the
8There may be a similarity between retiring because of a perceived close election, andthus risking being
replaced by a member the opposite party, andretirement in appointment systems where there is a risk the
governor willnominate someone of the opposite party. However, the probability of a same party governor
nominating a member of the other party is extremely small.
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ideological nature ofjudicial elections, even in non-partisan elections (see Bonneau and
Hall 2009), the appointed justice may not be safe. Two states in my sample, Michigan
and Oregon, do grant an additional advantage to mid-term appointees. In both Michigan

and Ohio, mid-term appointments have some designation listing them on the ballot as the
incumbent. Possible incumbency effects will be controlled for within the statistical
model.

This two-part theory accounts for justices in both pure appointment systems

(gubernatorial and legislative) and electoral systems (partisan, non-partisan, and hybrid).
One method of selection remains yet to be placed within this theory, the Missouri Plan.
While the governor does initially select the justices, albeit following the work of a

nominating commission, the justices must stand for in uncontested retention elections at
regular intervals. With aspects of both appointment and electoral systems, the Missouri

Plan is markedly different than the other methods of selection and retention9.
Uncontested elections, like those used in the Missouri Plan, generally experience

a significant amount of ballot roll-off (Klien and Baum 2001). This is because the nature
of non-contested retention elections provides little information to the average voter.

Campaigning for these positions occur only extremely rarely and the ballot provides no
information to the voter in terms of partisan affiliation. Indeed, the vast majority of

justices in Missouri Plan states are comfortably retained. This is to say, the occurrence in
Iowa 2010 which saw three justices removed is an anomaly. To put it in perspective, in
the entire history of retention elections in Iowa dating back to 1962, not a single justice
9Justices can also leave state supreme courts bybeing appointed to thefederal bench. In my data, each
selection system saw between 4-5% of their justices appointed to the federal bench. There was no
statistically significant difference across selection systems, so departing in this fashion is considered right
censored.

53

had previously failed to be retained. I argue, because of these factors, Missouri Plan
justices likely do not find retention elections to be a motivating factor concerning
retirement. That is, since it is unlikely a justice will fail to be retained by the electorate,

they will make their strategic retirement calculation in an identical fashion to those

justices in pure appointment systems. Justices in states which use the Missouri Plan,
unmoved by retention elections, will seek to retire strategically when the governor is

ideologically compatible with them10.
Therefore, depending on the method of selection and retention, there are two

different ways in which justices could retire from the bench strategically. Appointment

systems allow justices to predict the likelihood of an ideological successor since they
know the partisan proclivities of the body which will nominate the candidate. Strategic
retirement in electoral systems should be different. Justices do not have the ability to

predict the ideology of their successor with any certainty. Justices in states that use
contested elections to staff their high court should be more likely to retire when there is a

higher probability of defeat in the next election. I hypothesize thatjustices regardless of
the system of selection and retention have avenues available to them to retire
strategically, and it is the institution which will channel this behavior.
Why Event History?

Each of the hypotheses under examination in the following chapters asks a

question concerning judicial careers. Careers of any type are not time invariant events.
To properly consider the nature and determinants of careers, one must take into account

10 While a nomination commission is at work in states which use the Missouri Plan, the final choice lies
with the governor.
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the duration of the occurrence. For example, the decision to retire does not occur at the

point someone leaves his or her employment. The decision to retire is continuous, with
various inputs that occur over time, leading to an event. Careers are a process, not a

culmination of a series of discrete points in time, and the choice of modeling strategy
should take this into account.

Event history modeling, also known as duration modeling or survival analysis, is

concerned with analyzing the time until an event occurs and what causes variation in that
timeline (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Much of the origin of this type of
statistical model arises from the medical field, where researchers wished to know how

long did patients survive on different types of stimuli, usually various drugs (Collett
2003). My explicit interest in each of three empirical chapters which follow concerns the
amount of time until an event occurs and the statistical causes of said event. In this way,

my research is akin to these medical studies, whereas my patients take the form of state
supreme courtjustices, and my drugs are represented by different control variables. The
dependent variable in each of these chapters is the time until the event of interest, be it

leaving the bench for any reason (Chapters III and IV) or specifically retirement or losing
an election (Chapter V).

In Chapter III I ask whether each of the methods of selection used to populate
state courts of last resort distribute a different amount of risk to their justices. This

question implicitly evokes an event history framework, given that the very nature of the
event history approach assumes that the individuals or cases under observation are at
some risk of an event occurring. In Chapter IV, I test the claims of judicial reformers that

increasing amounts of campaign spending leads to higher levels of accountability and
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thus, shorter judicial careers. My variable of interest, total campaign spending, is

equivalent to varying the dosage of a drug given to a set of patients to determine if it has
any effect on their lifespan. In Chapter V, I examine whetherjustices in both
appointment and electoral systems strategically retire from the bench. While my
variables of interest are different depending on the model being estimated, I am

attempting to examine whether justices are more likely to retire under a condition which
would be most favorable strategically. The questions I am asking in each of these

chapters concern the nature of duration, risk, and removal, and are best answered using a
modeling strategy that can incorporate all three. The event history environment is the
appropriate context for my analyses.
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CHAPTER III

DOES ACCOUNTABILITY VARY? INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS
ON THE CAREERS OF STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES

"Judges have considerable discretion and should be held accountable for
their choices, at least at the state level where we would expect a close
connection between public preferences and public policy"
(Bonneau and Hall 2009 p. 2).

"An independent judiciary as provided by the Constitution has assured that
the governed as well as the government are bound by the Rule of Law."
(Sandra Day O'Connor 2003)
Introduction

The 2010 Supr,eme Court retention elections in Iowa were a very clear

demonstration of judicial accountability. For the first time since the installation of the
Missouri Plan in Iowa in 1962 a justice failed to be retained at the polls. Indeed, three
justices; Chief Justice Marsha K. Ternus, Justice Michael J. Streit, and Justice David L.
Baker, were removed from office by the voters. An expensive campaign, in large part
funded by the National Organization for Marriage and the American Family Association,
painted all the justices on the Iowa Supreme Court as liberal extremists out of touch with
the citizens of Iowa. Arguing that the justices' decision in Varnum v. Brien (2009),
which overturned a statute banning gay marriage, did not represent the values of Iowa,

the campaign urged voters to remove the three justices standing for retention. And the
voters listened.
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The Missouri Plan, however, as envisioned by its most vocal proponents, the
American Judicature Society, is supposed to use retention elections for a reason much

like impeachment, not for ideological voting. They claim the Missouri Plan, which
incorporates elements ofjudicial selection taken from both gubernatorial appointment

systems and elections, is meant to increase judicial independence while still keeping
accountable through regular uncontested retention elections. The Missouri Plan is the
most recent development in terms of judicial selection in the states.
While some states in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries followed the federal
system ofjudicial appointment and retention, many others did not. In fact, in the early

history of the United States appointment by state legislatures as well as various forms of
judicial elections proved to be popular in the states. Then, the early Twentieth century

brought with it an increase in the use ofjudicial elections. Subsequently, judicial reform
groups advocated for what they term merit selection as a way to remove politics from the

courts.11 Many states have since agreed, choosing to utilize some form ofthis selection
system to for their judges. The result is great variety in the states today regarding judicial
selection.

Thus, there is a long tradition in the U.S. of arguments on the subject of the
various means of judicial selection, as well as those concerning the desired nature of
judicial behavior more generally. Indeed, to assert there is a controversy regarding
methods ofjudicial selection in the states would downplay the current policy landscape,

1' While reformers and advocates refer to this as themerit system, it often is also called the Missouri Plan,
as that state is credited with being the first to implement this system in 1940. At a minimum this selection
mechanism incorporates nomination by commission but usually also includes retention elections. We use
the terms merit selection and the Missouri Plan interchangeably.
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in terms of both numbers of players and the level of rhetoric. A critical reason for the

intensity of this debate is that judicial selection systems play directly into the normative

issue of whether judges should be independent or accountable. Yet, accountability via

politicalparticipation is essentialto all democratic institutions, including the judiciary
(Bonneau and Hall 2009; Hall 2001a). There is much at stake when it comes to the

selection system each state chooses for its judiciary. Consequently, the terms of the

debate tend to plunge into a level of hyperbole, often (but not always) with claims made
based on a lack of empirical research by either side to support their assertions.

Accountability is one of the key claims made by those in favor of electoral

systems. That is, because judges must stand for election, there is a greater likelihood that
they will be held answerable for their actions and judgments on the bench. If a judge is
making decisions that are out of tune with the prevailing political mainstream within the
state, the electoral mechanism provides the public with a means of removal and

replacement, thus enhancingjudicial accountability (Bonneau and Hall 2009).
On the other hand, proponents of merit-based selection seek to maximize the goal

of judicial independence, in order to shield judges from external influences deemed
inappropriate when it comes to interpreting the law. These advocates, including Justice
O'Connor and the American Judicature Society, among others, favor this selection

system, believing that choosing and retaining judges in this manner enables them to make
decisions regarding the law that are free from political or electoral constraints, thus
augmenting judicial independence.

In addition to electoral and merit systems of selection, governors and legislatures

have the power to appoint judges in a number of states. Judicial appointment by these
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political elites is often considered similar to merit selection in terms of the purposes
behind these selection systems. That is, it is thought that appointive systems tend to
promote judicial independence.
As this debate has been constructed, then, conventional wisdom holds that

elections promote accountability while appointive and merit systems instead advance

independence. However, this notion that differing selection systems produce various
levels of accountability has never been directly or systematically tested. The question
thus becomes whether the various selection systems in fact have different effects on
accountability.

Accountability and independence are multi-faceted concepts. Selection systems

that promote accountability can still have individuals remain in office for over twenty

years, while selection systems that promote independence can have individuals leave
office after a single year. The purpose in this paper is to examine empirically if the
various systems of judicial selection have systematic affects on the length of state

supreme courtjustices' careers. Accordingly, I enter this debate not to take anyparticular
side, but instead to test this particular issue within this controversy: whether different
mechanisms of judicial selection produce varying lengths of tenures on state supreme

courts. While the analysis does not examine directly the levels of accountability in each

of the systems, accountability is clearly impugned. Although accountability is a complex
concept, institutional designers (and I) see a direct connection between the amount of risk
of removal and accountability. I will examine the likelihood of removal, and by proxy,
accountability.
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Judicial Selection and Accountability

Methods of selection of supreme court justices vary by each state, such that nearly

each state's selection system is unique. Nevertheless, the literature considers five broad,
institutional selection mechanisms in the states: partisan elections, non-partisan elections,

merit selection, gubernatorial appointment, and legislative appointment (Warrick 1993).
Partisan and non-partisan elections are similar vehicles for selecting judges, in
that candidates usually must make it first through a primary election and then win a

general election to attain a seat on the bench. The principal difference between these two
types of electoral systems concerns the manner the individuals are listed on the ballot,
either with or without a partisan label.

The common conception of Missouri Plan has been described as "a process in

which a non-partisan or bipartisan commission nominates a few individuals for a judicial
position, for appointment (usually) by the executive based on the commission's
recommended names, with subsequent tenure on the bench dependent upon a retention

election at specific intervals" (Hurwitz and Lanier 2001, 86, fn. 11). While merit
selection thus incorporates elements of both appointive and electoral systems, the vast

majority of judges subject to retention elections are in fact retained (Hall 2001b), and
thus the defining feature of merit systems is the initial nomination by commission
(Hurwitz and Lanier 2001). Nevertheless, advocates of this selection mechanism contend
that retention elections are a critical feature as well, in that they allow citizens to

determine whether judges continue in office.

In gubernatorial appointment states, judges are chosen by the governor, usually
with confirmation by the state senate. This system is thus analogous to judicial selection
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in the federal courts (Canon 1972). Finally, legislative appointment occurs in but two

states, Virginia and South Carolina, where their respective state legislatures have the
authority to choose and retain justices on their supreme court.

These are the five broad categories of selection systems used in the states. In this

chapter I am interested in how these several systems of judicial selection distribute risk
and thus affect the tenures of state supreme court justices. As Hall (2001a, 1136)

asserted in her study on how electoral pressures influence state judges to retire: "This
study is only the first that seeks to unravel the fascinating and complicated nexus between
democratic processes and career decisions in the states' highest courts. Countless

questions remain [and] further inquiry will be fruitful, especially for examining and
perhaps dispelling myths surrounding the politics of institutional design." In this paper I
carry on this line of research by examining the interplay between accountability and
judicial selection systems in state courts of last resort. In particular, I explore whether

different judicial selection systems produce varying lengths of judicial careers, which
theoretically, should vary with different levels of accountability.
Theory

For the purpose of this study, I define accountability as the length of tenure for a
justice on a state court of last resort. This definition recognizes that increased risk
produces increased accountability (Hall 2001a). That is, a greater risk of losing one's
seat on the bench coincides with an increasing level of accountability. Each type of
selection method has as one of its foundations the goal of subjecting justices to varying

levels of accountability, which is directly associated with the amount of risk of removal
that the individual justice faces. I acknowledge that this is only a proxy measure for
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accountability, as there are numerous other facets to accountability in office. However, I

am confident in arguing that since subjecting justices to more or less risk was a goal of
those of who instituted these different methods of selection within the various states, and

since more risk produces more likelihood for accountability, that the concept is measured

efficiently. While individuals may vary in terms of their relative accountability within
systems, when aggregated, these trends should appear. If we believe that accountability
has an effect how tenure length is affected in the aggregate, when these states are
analyzed together as systems differences should be apparent.

With this definition of accountability in mind, the theoretical expectations are

based in part on an institutional perspective (Aldrich 1995; Brace and Hall 1990; North
1990) and in part on conventional wisdom, both of which interestingly coincide here.
Both formal and informal institutions shape behavior in an endogenous setting. From an

institutional perspective, the various judicial selection systems should produce variable
levels of risk in predictable ways, based on the unique institutional arrangements of each
selection system. These various institutions, therefore, should have predictable affects on
the tenure length ofjustices in these different systems.

As well, conventional wisdom plays a role in the rhetoric regarding judicial
selection. Thus, there is much discussion, scholarly and otherwise, regarding the

perceived benefits of different selection systems based notions of accountability and
independence. For instance, both advocates and opponents ofjudicial elections generally
agree that judges who stand for some form of election are more likely to be held

accountable than judges in appointive systems. Stated otherwise, because of the
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institutional features of elections, judges exposed to elections should be at greater risk of
being forced off the bench than their colleagues in appointive systems.
While all the types ofjudicial elections potentially raise accountability to some
degree, the occurrence of risk - and thus the greatest potential for accountability - should
be highest in partisan elections. As Hall argued (2007, 1151), "voters vote when they
have interest, readily available information, and choice." Such increased interest and
information are likely to be highest in partisan elections, because 1) partisan elections
produce the most expensive campaigns, which in turn increases the electorate's access to
information (Bonneau and Hall 2009), and 2) partisan elections have the potential to field
high quality challengers, which in turn increases both information and choice (Hall and
Bonneau 2006). Furthermore, even if voters do not absorb a sufficient amount of
information about the judicial candidates from the campaign, candidates for these offices
are listed with their partisan affiliation present on the ballot, a key source of information
for many voters (Downs 1957).
Structurally, non-partisan elections are near mimics of their partisan counterparts,

save for the fact that the candidates' partisan affiliation is not listed on the ballot in non
partisan elections. Because there is no partisan cue, and because non-partisan campaigns
are less expensive than their partisan counterparts, voters consequently have
comparatively less information and interest in non-partisan elections (Bonneau and Hall
2009).

Accordingly, due to the nature of competitive elections I hypothesize that non

partisan electoral systems should produce high levels of accountability and thus, shorter

12 For these reasons, successful challengers in non-partisan elections usually spend quite a bitofmoney,
certainly more than the norm, in order to overcome the information deficit that ordinarily accompanies non
partisan campaigns (Bonneau and Hall 2009).
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tenure lengths for these justices comparatively. However, since partisan elections hold
relatively more risk, accountability should be somewhat lower in non-partisan elections.
While retention elections are not associated with analogous levels of risk as

competitive elections, advocates of the Missouri Plan make clear that retention elections
provide voters with the ability to hold judges accountable. Notwithstanding, retention
elections are generally low-salience affairs where candidates do not face any challengers
and where there is strong evidence of ballot roll-off (Bonneau and Hall 2009). The

expectation is that retention elections do produce lower levels of accountability than
partisan or non-partisan elections. The reformers claim that this non-contested retention
election is the accountability function which both gubernatorial appointments and

legislative selection systems lack. Therefore, they see the Missouri Plan as having less
accountability than competitive elections, but more than the other appointment selections
systems Retention elections remain, at their core, elections.

Consistent with

advocates' claims, retention elections should produce higher levels of risk than

appointive systems, which are generally thought to produce judges who are independent,
as occurs in the federal system (Hamilton, Federalist. 78). That is, while gubernatorial
and legislative appointment systems subject judges to some accountability when their
terms come to an end (which distinguishes them somewhat from the federal system), the

institutional mechanism ofjudicial appointment puts judges under less risk than electoral
systems, as judges are only accountable to the executives and legislators responsible for

13 For instance, the American Judicature Society recently countered criticism that voters had no sayin the
merit system for the Kansas Supreme Court by asserting that the state's electorate is able to vote in
retention elections every six years (Koranda 2010).
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their retention. Ifjudges make decisions in line with their fellow political elites in these
other branches, rarely should they be at risk of losing their positions.
In sum, the methods of selection and retention used in state supreme courts should

affect the tenure ofjustices in predictable ways, as different institutional arrangements
subject the justices to varying levels of risk that should be directly related to
accountability. To reiterate the theoretical expectations, partisan elections should

produce maximum levels of accountability, as the risk justices assume here is likely to be
highest relative to the other selection mechanisms. Justices in partisan electoral systems
should, on average, have the shortest tenures in comparison to the other methods of
selection. Non-partisan judicial elections should similarly generate high levels of

accountability, though perhaps not as much as that found in more salient partisan
elections. Justices in these non-partisan elections should experience tenure lengths longer

than partisan elections and shorter than retention elections. While I expect retention

elections, which by definition are non-competitive, to provide less risk and accordingly
less accountability than the competitive electoral systems, I follow the claims of reform

groups which state that justices facing retention elections have greater levels of
accountability than those confronting gubernatorial or legislative appointment. Stated

otherwise, justices in appointive systems will have the most independence, the lowest
levels of accountability and, thus, the longest tenure, since they are theoretically prone to
less risk than any of the elective systems.

An alternative hypothesis, departing from the claims of the reforms groups can
however be constructed. Following the work of Langer (2002), I hypothesize that

justices in both gubernatorial and legislative selection systems will exhibit higher levels
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of risk than those in Missouri plan systems. Justices within these appointment systems

have their retention tied to the partisan interests of one of the two other branches of

government. This creates an environment that may indeed be hostile to the interests of

the incumbent judge. While Langer acknowledges that justices often behave in a fashion
so as to not garner retribution from the appointing institution, these political elites are
active observers of the judicial branch, and thus, while they might not be removing

justices, their pressure can force justices to retire. For this reason, I specify an alternative
hypothesis which claims that I expect to find higher levels of accountability in

gubernatorial appointment and legislative selection systems than is found in Missouri
Plan systems.
Data and Methods

I collected data on the length of tenure for every individual state supreme court

justice who served in one of sixteen states from 1980 to 2005.1 categorized each state as

employing one of the following selection and retention systems: 1) partisan election, 2)
non-partisan election, 3) retention election, or 4) appointment. These sixteen states are
selected because they incorporate classic features of the respective selection systems

without significant modification. Further, I chose four states from each selection system
so that all of the categories would be equally represented. This sample was chosen

randomly from a list of each of the states within the category that had pure, unmodified
archetypes. While some categories (legislative election and partisan election) had a
limited number to choose from the others—gubernatorial, the Missouri Plan, and non-
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partisan elections—were randomly sampled. Table 2 provides the states analyzed herein
and their respective methods of selection.
Table 2

Descriptive Statistics

Number of

XT

,

~

States

Method of Selection

Alabama

Partisan Election

31

22

Louisiana

Partisan Election

18

11

Texas

Partisan Election

44

34

West Virginia

Partisan Election

19

14

Kentucky

Non-partisan Election

21

13

Oregon

Non-partisan Election

24

17

Washington

Non-partisan Election

29

19

Wisconsin

Non-partisan Election

18

11

Iowa

Retention election

20

13

Kansas

Retention Election

18

11

Oklahoma

Retention election

18

9

Nebraska

Retention Election

20

13

Maine

Gubernatorial Appointment

22

16

New Jersey

Gubernatorial Appointment

19

12

South Carolina

Legislative Election

14

8

Virginia

Legislative Election

19

12

351

232

Justices

Totals

Number of Departures

15

'""According to mycoding rules, the Missouri Plan is thus represented by retention elections. I aggregated
gubernatorial and legislative appointmentinto a single "appointment" category, in part because only two states utilize
legislative appointment and only a few more employ gubernatorial appointment. Since both gubernatorial and
legislative selection methods are appointive in nature, and since I include all selection systems in our study, it made
theoretical sense to combine them.

15 A departure occurs when a justice leaves the bench for any reason during theperiod of analysis from 1980-2005,
including retirement, resignation, losing an election, or death.
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Table 2 also displays the number of justices and departures for each state in my

study from 1980 to 2005. A departure occurs when a justice leaves the bench during the

period of analysis for any reason, which might include retirement, resignation, losing an
election, or death. I am keenly interested in the departures in this study, since I anticipate
that the time a justice leaves the bench is conditioned on her selection system.
Individuals may leave the bench for reasons which are unrelated to the risks

levied upon them because of the institution system in which they serve. However, there is
no theoretical reason to assume that these departures are not evenly distributed across all
the methods of selection. To say more frankly, there is no assumption that a justice in a

partisan electoral systemwill be more likely to experience a death than were she in an
appointment system. Examining judge quality, a predictor of nomination to the federal
bench, Glick and Emmert (1987) show that there are no statistically significant

differences across the selection systems. Looking specifically at my data, 7% of justices

in partisan systems are nominated to the federal bench, which is not statistically different
(when taking into account sample size) from the 9% in non-partisan, the 8% in

appointment systems, and the 4% in Missouri Plan states. There are reasons thoughto
assume that retirements and resignations can be related to the method of selection. Hall

(2001) argued that decisions to leave the bench can be motivated by future electoral
fortunes and that these may not be distributed evenly across the methods of selection.
Indeed, my theory concerning the distribution of risk within each system incorporates
such departures into my hypotheses.

Accordingly, the dependent variable is operationalized as the length of time a

justice served on the state supreme court, which takes into account when a justice's
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tenure ended. In order to assess the effect of methods of selection upon the duration of

the justice's tenure, I incorporate variables to represent non-partisan elections, retention
elections, and appointive systems. In the full model this means that partisan elections
serve as the statistical baseline, allowing for direct comparison of the tenure rate for each
method of selection. Three dichotomous control variables were included in the frill

model; gender, minority status (White or non-White), and whether the state imposes a

retirement age. The literature is unclear on the effect of gender or minority status on

judicial tenure, though we do know that a state's method of selection has no effect on the
likelihood of a woman or minority reaching the high court (Hurwitz and Lanier 2003,

2008). I hypothesize that an individual's gender or minority status will have no effect on

their judicial tenure; though include these variables since the empirical question should
be examined. States which impose a retirement age should have shorter judicial tenures
than those which do not.

One time-varying covariate (TVC) included in the model, which is the absolute
value of the difference between the justices PAJID score and the state's respective Barry

et al. score.16 PAJID scores, which measure justice ideology, and the Barry et al. scores,
which measure government or electorate ideology, are on a common metric and thus
facilitate this variable. While some studies have examined dynamic effects of party or

diversity in state courts, it remains to be seen whether these serve as potential influences
on judges' tenures (Brace and Hall 1990; Hurwitz and Lanier 2003). I hypothesize that

16 For states which the electorate plays an active role in selecting justices (Partisan, Non-Partisan,
Retention), I utilized the citizen ideology scores; in appointive states I used the government ideology
scores.
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as the distance between the justice's ideology and the institution responsible for thenretention increases, the will be more likely to leave the bench.

Intuitively, this study is akin to a medical experiment where a selection of patients
has been given one of four different drugs, and our interest would be in learning how

long patients generally survive on each of these drugs and what their risk of death is. In
this circumstance, the four different drugs are represented by the various methods of

judicial selection analyzed, while the patients' lives and deaths are depicted by the
justices' tenure lengths. Of course, I am not concerned with the patients' death; instead,
the interest lies in how long the justices served at the time of their exit from the bench
based on their particular selection system.

The appropriate statistical method to analyze data of this sort is an event history
model, also known as hazard models (Collett 2003). There are a number of hazard

models from which to choose, based on the assumptions of the model and the data
utilized. The type I opted to employ is a Cox proportional hazard model. I utilized this

semi-parametric technique because I have no hypothesis concerning the shape of the
duration dependency. Parametric models assume specific distributions when modeling
the hazard function. My only assumption is that the hazard rate will be different in

predictable ways across the various methods of selection, not that the hazard rate will
have a specific distributional form. Thus, the Cox proportional hazard model is most
appropriate method for this research (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Cox 1972).

Employing event history models to examine temporally-ordered data has a rich
history in political science (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). In particular, Cox
proportional hazard models (hereafter, "hazard models" or "Cox models") have been
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applied in research on judicial politics. For instance, Shipan and Shannon (2003) used a
hazard model to examine the duration of Supreme Court nominations and confirmation,

while Langer et al. (2003) applied this model to analyze how associate justices on state
supreme courts selected their chief justices. From a methodological perspective this
research is analogous to these studies, as I examine the duration of tenure of state

supreme court justices.] 7
When dealing with duration models with data of this sort, issues of left truncation

and right censoring become apparent. Left truncation occurs when an individual in the
dataset joined the risk pool prior to the first observation. In our study, this means a

justice was selected for a judicial position at some point before 1980, when I begin the
analysis. These individuals do not enter at t=0, because it is known from the data we
collected when their tenure first began as a Supreme Court justice. Thus, a justice may

have been unobserved by this study for 8 years, but when she enters our risk pool I code
the data as if she began her tenure at t=9. On the other hand, right censoring occurs when

a justice continues to serve after the end of observation period in 2005. In event history
analysis employing Cox models, neither of these circumstances is problematic, because
we are interested in the occurrence and non-occurrence of an event, in this case

departures, during the period of analysis. That is, individuals who are coded as left
truncated in the data contribute information to the model at the point they become

observed, while right censored data contribute information to the model until they are no
longer observed (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

l7Other examples of studies injudicialpolitics using event history models that arenot Cox proportional
hazard models include Patton (2007) and Savchak et al. (2006).
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In order to identify a Cox hazard model, the analyst must first assess the
proportionality of hazard rates across different values of the independent variables. "The
Cox Model assumes that the hazard function of any two individuals with different values

on one or more covariates differ only by a factor or proportionality" (Box-Steffensmeier
and Zorn 2001, 974). If this assumption does not hold true, the estimates of all the

covariates in the model could be biased, not just the offending variables. Following the
lead of Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, I examined the assumption of proportionality by

testing the scaled Schoenfeld residuals, and found no evidence of non-proportionality.
Furthermore, because of the nature of the analysis, it is appropriate to cluster the standard

errors from the model to get more accurate estimates of the empirical reality. In this
chapter, the variation within each state may systematically affect the duration, as such;
the standard errors are clustered on the state. I now examine the Cox models in order to

analyze accountability across selection systems.
Results

Figure 7 illustrates mean judicial tenures as a function of selection system. This
figure shows that accountability across the methods of selection varies. In particular,
justices in partisan electoral systems have the shortest tenures on average, while justices

in merit-based systems (via retention elections) serve for the longest period of time. This
lends initial support for the hypotheses, as partisan elections followed by non-partisan
elections apparently provide for the most accountability among selection systems as
evidenced by departure rates. This figure also suggests that retention elections, and not
appointments, descriptively produce the least amount of accountability. In fact, a justice

73

within a partisan election system can expect her tenure on the court to be about 25%
shorter than a justice serving in a state that uses retention elections.
The first step in testing these hypotheses is to examine whether the survivor
functions of the four methods of selection are equal. Collett (2003) demonstrated that the

log-rank test provides for such a test by pitting the hypotheses against the null hypothesis
that there is no difference between the survivor functions of the four selection systems.

Mean Tenure by Selection Method

Partisan
8.3436

Non-Parti san
8.65085

Appointment
9.31933

Retention
11.2782
I

I

10

0

Years

Figure 7. Mean judicial tenure as a condition of selection system.
The log-rank test in Table 3 shows that the survivor functions of the four methods
of selections are clearly discrete. The Kaplan-Meier survivor function is a similar test

that can be assessed graphically (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004), as shown in Figure
8. While the survivor functions overlap briefly, they demonstrate that the four methods
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of selection are largely distinct. Moreover, once again I find that retention elections have
the smallest amount of risk, as evidenced by the Kaplan-Meier Survivor function that

decreases the slowest (signifying the longest tenure) for this selection system. Therefore,
I can reject the null hypothesis of equal accountability across the selection systems;
survivor functions for each selection method are different. Thus, it is appropriate to
move on to the next step in the analysis.
Table 3

Log-Rank Testfor Equality in the Survivor Function

Selection method

Departures Observed

Departures Expected

Partisan

81

54.31

Non-Partisan

60

58.29

Appointment

46

51.19

Retention

45

68.20

Null hypothesis: equal failures expected.
Chi2(3) = 23.77
Pr>Chi2 = 0.00

While the log-rank test and Kaplan-Meier function provides some information on
the duration of the data, neither allows for direct comparisons of change in the hazard rate

across the methods of selection. I accordingly use the Cox model, which specifically

provides for direct comparisons in rates of change across time within the model. In

particular, the hazard model allows us to "determine if a variable increases duration by
looking at its effect on the baseline hazard rate" (Shipan and Shannon 2003, 662). A

variable with a negative coefficient signifies that it decreases the hazard rate, while a
positive coefficient connotes that the variable increases the hazard rate. Stated somewhat
differently, a negative coefficient indicates there is a decreasing likelihood of a justice
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leaving the bench when compared to the baseline hazard, while a positive coefficient
means that there is an increasing likelihood the justice will leave the bench compared to
the baseline hazard rate. With the TVC, ideological distance, a positive coefficient means
as the size of the distance increases, the likelihood of the justice leaving the bench
increases.

Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates
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Figure 8. Kaplan-Meier Test of Survivor Function estimates.

Table 4 displays the results of the Cox model. Two of the substantive variables,
appointment systems and retention elections, obtain statistical significance within the

model and are negatively signed. Two of the control variables, ideological distance and
minority status, are statistically significant and positively signed. This means that both of
these variables serve to increase the hazard rate.
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Substantively, this signifies that when compared to the baseline hazard rate of
partisan elections, appointive systems and retention elections experience longer careers;

that is, both systems elicit a decrease in the hazard rate, which corresponds directly to a
decrease in the level of distributed risks. The model shows that while partisan and non

partisan elections are not statistically different in terms of their level of accountability,
both appointment systems and retention elections distribute a significantly lower amount
of risk to their justices.
Table 4

CoxProportional HazardModel of theDuration ofJudicial Tenure, bySelection System
Variable

Estimate (s.e)

Change in Hazard Rate

Non-Partisan Election

- .326 (.251)

-28%

Appointment

- .614 (.311)*

-46%

Retention Election

- .985 (.268)*

-63%

Retirement Age

- .120 (.171)

-11%

Gender

-.296 (.182)

-26%

Minority

.612 (.165)*

84%

Ideological Distance

.001 (.000)*

1.1%18

Log Likelihood = -1106.136
LRChi2 = 31.71
Prot»Chi2 = 0.00
N=3213

Scaled Schonfeld residual global test p>chi2 = 0.12

The hazard models provide additional information, as I can use the statistics from
the model to rank the order of the different selection mechanisms in terms of the amount

of risk, and thus accountability, they produce. In particular, the last column of Table 4
18 This statistic was calculated with the ideological distance variable at its mean, and with a one standard
deviation change.
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depicts the relative change in the baseline hazard rate for each variable. The
interpretation of this statistic is intuitive, in that a positive percentage signifies that, when

compared to justices who stand for partisan elections, justices in states with that specific
selection method are more likely to leave the bench, while a negative outcome indicates

they are less likely to leave the bench relative to partisan elections. Accordingly, I find
that justices in non-partisan election systems are 28% less likely to leave the bench than

justices in partisan systems, while justices in appointive systems are 46% less likely to
depart than partisan election justices. Finally, justices subject to retention elections are

63%o less likely to exit the bench than justices subject to partisan elections. Apparently,
retention elections do not behave like their more competitive counterparts, as justices in

retention election systems are less than half as likely to relinquish the bench for any
reason compared to partisan justices.

Finally, Figure 9 plots the hazard rates for all of the methods of selection against

each other, as this figure provides graphical comparison of the length of careers produced
by these selection systems. To reiterate, the higher the hazard rate the more at risk

justices are of leaving the bench, as that selection system thus produces greater levels of
risk; conversely, the lower the hazard rate the more insulated from risk are justices from
that system. The selection system with the highest hazard rate, and thus the shortest

judicial tenure, is partisan elections, and no other selection system has a hazard rate that
is relatively close. This provides additional evidence that judges subject to partisan

elections are most at risk of exiting the bench, as this is likely the most accountable
selection system.
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The second highest hazard rate belongs to non-partisan elections, followed
relatively closely by that for appointive systems. Since the hazard rates for non-partisan
and appointive systems are relatively close, these selection systems behave similarly,
though justices in non-partisan elections have somewhat shorter careers than justices in

appointive systems. Lastly, the selection system with the lowest hazard rate by far, and
thus the system with the least amount of risk, is retention elections. In fact, partisan

election justices have a higher risk of leaving the bench in their fifth year in office than
retention election justices have in their 25th year on the bench. Clearly, the risk of
departing the bench is far lower for justices in retention elections than for justices in any
of the other selection systems.
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Figure 9. Cox Proportional Hazard rates of the duration of judicial tenure, by selection
system.
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Conclusion

The findings from the hazard models largely support my theoretical expectations
on varying levels of risk. Similarly, the results are chiefly, but not entirely, consistent
with conventional wisdom in this regard. It is expected that partisan and non-partisan
elections should be the two methods of selection that distributed the most risk to their

justices, with partisan elections at the top, and that is precisely what I found. Justices in
partisan elections have the shortest tenures and the greatest departure rates - that is, they
leave the bench more often and earlier than justices from states with different selection
methods. Clearly, this research shows the selection method that holds the greatest
amount of accountability is partisan elections.

While non-partisan elections produce significantly more risk than either retention

elections or appointment, they are not quite as effective in this regard as partisan
elections. Nevertheless, the results demonstrate that competitive elections, whether

partisan or non-partisan, are the most accountable institutions when it comes to judicial
selection in state supreme courts.

My theory, which relied in part on conventional wisdom, also claimed that
retention elections should produce less risk than their electoral counterparts, since

retention elections are non-competitive by design. Here again the results comport with
expectations. However, following the reform groups, it was expected that retention
elections would be more accountable institutions than appointment systems. After all,
retention elections are still elections; as well, there is anecdotal reasoning that

appointments are designed to produce independent but not necessarily accountable judges
(see, e.g., Federalist 78). On this point my alternative hypothesis, not that of the
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reformers, is supported. Justices in appointment systems turned out to have shorter

judicial careers than those judges in merit systems. Thus, my hypothesized rank order of
selection systems by risk is correct
In the states examined that employ retention elections, only one justice was

removed by the voters in 122 retention elections over 25 years of our analysis (1980-

2005); and, the average tenure rate was significantly longer with retention elections than
with other methods of selection. The American Judicature Society (2010) claims the

institution of retention election "provides an opportunity to remove from office those who
do not fulfill their judicial responsibilities." Opportunity, however, is not necessarily the
equivalent of action. These findings evince that retention elections produce very little

risk to the justices who are subject to run in them. Thus, if judicial accountability is the
primary goal with respect to state courts of last resort, our findings suggest that merit

systems with retention elections are not a wise choice. However, if judicial independence
is the overriding objective, then retention elections provide the best mechanism for

maximizing this goal. While these findings and conclusions are somewhat consistent
with those of other scholars, particularly Bonneau and Hall (2009) and Hall (2001a), this
research adds nuance to the literature on judicial selection in the states in that no other

study has incorporated a research design such as this. Indeed, hazard models proved
well-suited to analyzing the varying levels of accountability among state courts.

19 In a recent paper, Reddick and Caufield (2010) of the American Judicature Society claimed that merit
selection systems produce higher-quality judges than judicial elections. In support they showed how judges
in merit systems are disciplined for ethical violations less often than elected judges, and that when judges
are disciplined the sanctions - including removal from the bench - are more severe in merit systems. Our
study does not specifically address the issues they raised. However, our findings do show that judges in
states with partisan and non-partisan elections are much more likely to depart the bench for any reason than
judges subject to the Missouri Plan.
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The purpose in this paper was not to take sides in the current debate on what is the
best or most appropriate judicial selection system. Instead, my aim was to assess

assumptions on both sides of the debate regarding risk and accountability by subjecting
those assumptions to rigorous empirical testing. In that endeavor, I feel I have been
successful. Perhaps the most interesting finding of this study is that retention elections
produce far less accountability than previously had been assumed. The belief that
retention elections produce levels of accountability similar to other electoral systems is

simply not borne out by the data and empirical tests. In fact, I do not think I am
overstating the case by saying that the belief that retention elections provide even a
modicum of accountability is simply a stylized fiction. The occurrence in Iowa thus
should be recognized for what it is: a notable outlier.

The title of this chapter asks, "does accountability vary?" The findings support an
answer to this question in the affirmative. While it has been assumed that that methods
of selection could be rank-ordered by level of accountability, this hazard models proved
very capable in doing so empirically by examining the tenure ofjudicial careers. Thus, in

this paper I have followed Hall's (2001a) plea for further research by examining the
nexus of democratic processes and institutional design regarding selection in state courts
of last resort. There remains much to study with respect to this heated debate, and I hope

that scholars continue rigorous empirical testing of the effects of the various judicial
selection methods in the states.
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CHAPTER IV

MONEY AND ELECTIONS: DOES CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE

AFFECT JUDICIAL TENURE?

Introduction

There is little doubt that in the past ten years profound changes have occurred
regarding the funding ofjudicial elections. According to Justice at Stake, campaign

spending has more than doubled injudicial elections from the 1990s to the 2000s, rising
from $83.3 million to $206.9 million (Justiceatstake.org 2010). According to many
reports, the tone ofjudicial elections has changed as well. Judicial elections historically
had been low salience affairs, marked with little money spent by the candidates and

advertising that was generally demure (Streb 2007). One commentator has famously
noted that "new" style judicial elections are, "noisier, nastier, and costlier" (Schotland
1985, 76). These claims are generally followed by the additional argument that judicial
independence is being eroded at the cost of public accountability at the polls (see
O'Connor 2010).

Judicial elections have been the ongoing target of advocacy groups who seek to

end this method of selecting judges. Groups such as the American Judicature Society, the
Brennan Center for Justice, Justice at Stake, and the American Bar Association have

come out actively as opponents to judicial elections. These groups make numerous
claims concerning the deleterious effects that increased campaign spending has on the

judiciary. Amongst their claims, they argue that the increased money spent in elections
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has lowered the legitimacy of the judiciary in the eyes of the public. In the "New Politics

of Judicial Elections 2000-2009," released by the Brennan Center for Justice, the authors
claim that "More than seven in ten Americans believe that campaign contributions affect
the outcome of courtroom decisions" (4, but see Gibson et al. 2011). One of the most

vocal opponents ofjudicial elections, ex-Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
has argued that the amount of money spent on judicial elections has called into question

the judicial independence ofjudges (O'Connor 2010). She contended that the increased
spending by judicial candidates has caused an erosion of public confidence in the courts.
Outside of her concerns that the election ofjudges reduces the consistency and
predictability of the law, she claims that as increasingly large amounts of money enter
into judicial elections the judges may be expected by their contributors to make decisions

in a certain fashion, thereby eroding the independence of the judges to rule solely based
in the law.

While the opponents of judicial elections are concerned with the effects of
campaign funding on public confidence and judicial independence, they seem little
concerned with how this increased money might affect the careers of their justices.

Political scientists know much about the effect of campaign spending in congressional
elections (Jacobson 2006), but we still know precious little about its effect on the
dynamics and length ofjudicial careers. Recognizing there are significant differences
between judicial elections (both partisan and non-partisan) and U.S. House elections,
there are some findings from the congressional literature which may be relevant to this
enterprise, because at their root both electoral institutions are still expressions of the
democratic will of the people. Just as a representative's constituency can remove him
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when failing to meet expectations, so can judges be removed when their decisions fall
outside of regional public sentiment and local moral convictions (Hall 2009).
First, Abramowitz's (1991) finding that as costs of campaigning rise, incumbents

are better positioned to raise more money than challengers, is likely. Second, it is

probable that spending by challengers has a larger effect on the outcome of an election
than spending by incumbents (Jacobson 1990). Finally, the ability to raise a significant
amount of money as an incumbent could lead to less quality (if any) challengers (Epstein
andZemsky 1995).

Bonneau and Hall (2009), in one of the few pieces than examine the effect of

campaign spending on judicial elections (though not judicial tenure), found that money
plays a significant role in determining the outcome of election, but that this arises from
the monetary difference between spending of incumbents and challengers. They claim
incumbents raise and spend more money than challengers, and thus, are better able to

educate the public. However, their analysis looks at elections as one-shot games without
taking into account the individuals' judicial careers over the long term.

In order to completely assess the effect of campaign spending on judicial tenure,

judicial elections cannot be examined as simply one-shot games; instead, they should be
analyzed as a series of repeated events. These repeating events, the elections, are
markers we can use to examine the span and determinants of a judge's judicial career.
By taking into account the temporal aspect ofjudicial careers, we will be able to assess
more accurately if campaign spending has an effect on judicial tenure, and if so, what
effect it has.
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Judicial Elections and Judicial Tenure

Historically, there has not been much work done on the contours of judicialtenure
at the state level. Curry and Hurwitz (2010) compared the relative tenure rates of

Supreme Court justices in sixteen different states from 1980-2005. They found that when
compared to states that use gubernatorial appointment, legislative election, or retention
elections, contested elections, whether they are partisan or non-partisan, have on average

significantly shorter tenure rates for their judges. Curry and Hurwitz attributed this
finding to the fact that the other methods of selection insulate the members of their
judiciaries from contested elections by providing other means for their retention or
removal20.

It is likely that candidates in partisan and non-partisan elections are under

different pressures and have different internal determinants ofjudicial tenure than do
those justices who are chosen by other less competitive means. These judges must face
challengers, appeal to their constituents, and raise money with which to campaign. These
are unique circumstances that judges in other selection systems do not face. Judges in

gubernatorial nomination and legislative elections states do not need to raise funds for
their re-election, nor do they actively need to face challengers. These competitive
elections are different from retention elections where judges are subjected to an up-or-

down vote from the electorate. These contests are usually low salience, low knowledge

affairs, in part because candidates for retention very rarely spend money for their "re
election." It is onlywithin partisan and non-partisan elections where we find contestation

20 Whileretention elections are a form of election, they are not contested elections and thus the individuals
who serve in these systems are at less risk of removal.
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and significant sums of money being spent. It is these two conditions that greatly increase
the risk of removal for these judges and place them on different institutional footing than

their counterparts chosen by other methods of selection. Just as North (1990) claimed that
institutions can channel individuals' actions, so do these institutions of judicial selection

influence judges' behavior by distributing greater risk.

Taking a closer examination at the life cycle ofjustices in partisan and non
partisan electoral systems will allow us not only to better assess the determinants of

judicial tenure, but will allow us to more completely understand the effect of increased
money being spent in judicial elections. While many outlets have examined the

increasing amount of money spent injudicial elections (Bonneau 2007, Justiceatstake.org
2010), no research has examined systematically and empirically whether the rise in
campaign spending has influenced the average judicial tenure.

Much of the reporting and scholarship that examines the increasing amount of
money being spent in judicial contests across the country have focused either on the
amount, the relative increase, the effect on public perception of the judiciary, and the

sources from which this money is coming. While all of these topics present timely and

important questions, it seems that researchers should also be examining other effects on
the individuals making decisions within these systems. While some research has
examined whether campaign donations affect a lawyer's likelihood of winning before a
court (Cann 2002; 2007), no scholar has examined if campaign spending affects a judge's
likelihood of leaving the court.

Scientifically, we know much about just one side of the coin without having

flipped it over. To understand the effect money may have on the judicial system we need
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to know not only its influence on the dispositional outcome of the cases, but also how it
affects the judge's careers.
Theory

Judicial accountability and judicial independence are unquestionably linked not
only theoretically, but also in the minds of individuals on both sides of the judicial
selection debate. Alexander Hamilton {Federalist 78, 398-399) argued that in order to

avoid "arbitrary discretion in the courts" there must be "permanency of the judicial
offices." Hamilton continued in Federalist 78: "temporary duration in office . . . would

have a tendency to throw the administration ofjustice into hands less able, and less well

qualified to conduct it with utility and dignity" (at 399). During the Jacksonian Era, the

push for popular elections for state supreme court judges took hold in a time where public
concern with cronyism was at its highest. It was thought that by putting judges under

popular control, that the judges would actually be more independent because they would
not be beholden to the party machines for their positions. It was also thought that by

increasing the accountability of judges through elections they would have less ability to
make decisions out of the current popular dynamic of public sentiment (Streb 2009).
When reformers speak of ceasing the use of elections to choose justices, they

claim they want to increase judicial independence. When former Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor argued, "In too many states, judicial elections are becoming

political prizefights where partisans and special interests seek to install judges who will
answer to them instead of the Constitution" (Justiceatstake.org, 4), she was describing the

potential for judicial independence eroding as a result of political accountability at the
polls. Theoretically, the reformers are claiming that judicial independence and political
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accountability can be traced on a linear path. As such, the more accountable an
institution, the individuals in it are less likely to make independent decisions. Indeed,

Hall argued that, "accountabilitycan be seen as an electoral competition, produced by the

willingness of challengers to enter the electoral arena and the propensity of the electorate
not to give their full support to incumbents (Hall 2009, 166)."

Figure 10 is a representation of one of the popularways in which to conceptualize
accountability and judicial independence in modern politics. This is not to say that

judicial independence and accountability are unidimensional concepts. There are
conceptions of both independence and accountability which fit easily into the

conceptualization. As an example, a judge in a system which has lifetime tenure can still
take into account public opinion and be simultaneously less independent and more
accountable and yet never encounter an election (see Mishler and Sheehan 1996).

However, the way in which the reformgroups have cast the debate, they make the

underlying assumption that more of one begets less of the other. Ajudge on the left hand
side of the figure would be completely accountable, possibly removable after every
decision the court handed down. A judge on the right hand side would be entirely

independent with lifetime tenure and no ability to be removed until retirement or death.
Clearly these two extremes do not exist within the American context, either at the state or
federal level, but they provide a starting point for discussion.

It seems an undisputed claim that among the methods of selection used by the

states that partisan and non-partisan elections are the most accountable because each of
the judges must stand for elections which can be contested.
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Accountable

Independent

Figure 10. Linear conceptualization of accountability and independence.
Indeed, Curry and Hurwitz (2010) show that judges who serve in states with

either partisan or non-partisan elections have significantly shorter judicial tenure when
compared to the other methods of selection.

Dating back to the early 1960s, it has been an empirical reality that incumbents in
Congress are better known and have higher name recognition with voters (Stokes and

Miller 1962). This incumbency advantage in Congress has been attributed to numerous
institutional advantages, but also the ease by which incumbents can raise money as
compared to their challengers (Abramowitz 1991). This allows incumbents to better
educate the public to their stances, but also increase their already-high name recognition.

When the total campaign expenditure begins to increase, it is generally on the basis of

more money being spent by the challenger which must then be responded to by the
incumbent. Challenger spending is considered to be more effective than incumbent
spending, as challengers are raising their name recognition and policy positions from a
low bar while incumbents trying to increase their name recognition from a much higher
starting point (Jacobson 1990). As such, when total spending in a campaign increases,
there is generally increased challenger spending. This theoretically, could put
incumbents in a more vulnerable position.

Reformers claim that with the increasing amount of money spent on judicial
elections in recent years, the judges in these systems are less independent than they once
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were. This does not acknowledge the fact that judicial elections have always been costly,

but it does acknowledge that more judicial races are becoming expensive, more

competitive, and more salient. DRI, an association of defense attorneys, stated in
publication:

Increased spending and fundraising activities targeting state judicial
elections have been working in tandem with heightened voter apathy and a
lack of information about judicial candidates. The confluence of these
trends means that states that elect their judges are especially vulnerable to
the unique ability of political action committees and ideological groups to
influence voters who lack the information necessary to properly evaluate
and filter the influx of messages about judges running for election or
retention. (DRI 2011, 15)

Reform groups, like DRI, are making the argument that it is not merely the

contestation in judicial elections which is eroding judicial independence, but the unique
occurrence of voting apathy coupled with significant amounts of campaign spending,
which increases the likelihood of individuals being removed from office. The claim

simply, is that campaign spending has a direct effect on individuals remaining in the
judicial office.

When discussing the perceived independence of judges in these systems we

encounter one of two possible responses: hyperbole or descriptive statistics. While
descriptive statistics have value, they cannot show a causal relationship between an
occurrence and an outcome. Referencing Figure 11, it would seem that the reformers are

saying that these judges, by the corollary, are also more accountable than they were
previously, or at the very least, at a higher risk of removal.
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Independent

As Spending Increases

Figure 11. Reformers' conceptualization of accountability and independence.

If increasingly higher levels of money are being spent injudicial campaigns, and

thereby reducing judicial independence, then reform groups are claiming, simultaneously,
that judges are becoming more accountable. The relationship being espoused is that the
more money is spent, the shorter the judicial career. The single hypothesis under

examination is thus: The higher the total amount spent by the candidates injudicial
elections, the shorter judicial tenure rates will be.
Data and Methods

The data for this analysis contains information on the length of tenure for every
individual state supreme court justice who served in one of eight states from 1990-2005.

They are categorized as either having served in systems with partisan or non-partisan

elections21. These eight states were chosen randomly from a list of states that have pure
forms of these electoral types22. Four from each system were selected so that each
method would be equally represented in the sample. Table 5 lists the states and thenmethods of selection.

21 While retention elections are at theircoreelections, theyare not included because the question under
examination in the paper concerns the effect of money on judicial tenure. Retention elections, generally
being low salience affairs, experience very little, if any, campaign spending in the time period examined

22 States which have modified systems were not included (e.g., Michigan has parties nominate individuals
but have candidates appear without a party ID on the ballot in the general election).
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Table 5

Descriptive Statistics
Number of Justices

Number of

States

Method of Selection

Alabama

Partisan Election

23

14

Louisiana

Partisan Election

12

6

Texas

Partisan Election

25

17

West Virginia

Partisan Election

8

4

Kentucky

Non-partisan Election

11

5

Oregon

Non-partisan Election

14

8

Washington

Non-partisan Election

16

8

Wisconsin

Non-partisan Election

10

4

126

66

Totals

Departures

Table 5 also displays the number of justices and departures during the period of

the analysis for each of the states. A departure occurs when a justice leaves the bench

during the period of analysis for any reason, which might include retirement, resignation,
losing an election, or death. I am distinctly interested in departures in this study, no
matter the type, as I believe that when a justice leaves the bench is influenced by the
amount of campaign spending that occurs during her tenure. I acknowledge that an
individual leaving the bench due to death is likely unrelated to the level of spending;
however, there is no theoretical reason to assume that these departures are not randomly
distributed. To state more simply, I do not believe that individual judges who

experienced highly expensive campaigns are more likely to die than those who did not.
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However, there are reasons to assume that retirement could be related to the amount of

money spent during the elections. Individuals who experience highly expensive

campaigns and are burdened with the need to raise large sums of money may decide to
end their careers earlier than individuals in less competitive elections.

Accordingly, the dependent variable is operationalized as the amount of time a

justice served on the bench. In order to assess the effect of campaign spending upon the
duration of the justices' tenure, the main independent variable, a time-varying covariate
(TVC), is operationalized as the log of the total amount of money spent by all candidates

inthe race during the election year23. This TVC will be carried over until the individual's
next election cycle where it will change to the current year's spending total. Judges who

run unopposed universally spent no money during their election years and are such listed

as having spent zero24. Individuals who are also first nominated to the bench are listed as
spending zero before they face their first election. In order to identify the model, this
variable is interacted with the time counter for each judge (Collett 2003).

I include five dichotomous control variables in the full model; gender, minority

status (White or non-White), whether the judge was in a partisan or non-partisan election
state, whether the state imposes a retirement age, and whether the judge was Republican

or Democrat25. While some studies have examined dynamic effects of party (Brace and
Hall 1990) or diversity (Hurwitz and Lanier 2003) in state courts, it remains to be seen

23 Thanks to Chris W. Bonneau for assistance with this data.

24 This is in opposition to much of the congressional literature which argues thatcandidates spend money to
dissuade challengers.

25 Ideally we would include a variable which measures theabsolute value of the difference between a
judges PAJID score and the state's Barry score. This is also a TVC and puts too strenuous a demand on the
model when calculating degrees of freedom. The model was run with it included, however, and no
statistically significant differences occurred.
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whether these serve as potential influences on judges' tenure and are therefore included
for specification purposes. States experience partisan ebbs and flows, and the variable
which measures partisan is included to capture this natural variance. I hypothesize that
individuals in partisan elections states and/or states with a mandatory retirement age will
on average have lower tenure. One other explanatory TVC, whether the incumbent was
opposed in the election, is also included. I assume that individuals who are unopposed
will be more likely to stay in office longer than those who do not.
The appropriate method by which to analyze this type of data is an event history
model, also known as a hazard model (Collett 2003). Using event history models has a

rich history in political science (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). There are many

types of event history models one can choose based upon assumptions about the
patterning of the data and the assumption concerning the duration dependency. I opt to
use a Cox proportional hazards model. I employ this semi-parametric technique because
I have no assumption concerning the form of the duration dependency. Parametric
models assume specific distributions when modeling the hazard function. My only

assumption is that the hazard rate will be different in predictable ways across the various
levels of campaign spending, not that the hazard rate will have a specific distributional

form. Thus, the Cox proportional hazard model is most appropriate for this research
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Cox 1972; Curry and Hurwitz 2010).
Event history analysis can be likened to a prescription drug trial, where some

patients receive a treatment, and some receive a placebo. My interest however is not time
until death or time until cure, but instead, time until leaving the bench. The treatment

takes the form of differing levels of the same drug, in this case, campaign spending. I
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expect that individuals will leave the bench at varying times based upon their level of
exposure to campaign spending. It is anticipated that individuals who experience
expensive campaigns will have shorter time on the bench as compared to those who have
less expensive campaigns or those justices who run unopposed.

When examining temporally ordered data, one must take into account issues of

left truncation and right censoring. Left truncation occurs when the individual under
observation enters the risk polling before the time the study begins. In this study left
truncation occurs when a judge is sitting on the bench currently at 1990 when our data

begins. If the judge has been on the court since 1984, instead of entering the analysis at
t=0, they will enter at t=6 and contribute information to the hazard function from the time

they are observed. This method of coding is followed for all individuals who enterthe
bench before 1990, updating their time counters accordingly. Right censoring occurs

when the time period of observation ends and there are individuals who still have not left

the risk pool. In this study it means a judge under observation continues serving after
2005. This occurrence is unproblematic for the Cox model, as the individual will
contribute information to the hazard function until the study ends. Even though the

individual's departure is unobservable, he still contributes information to the study (BoxSteffensmeier and Jones 2004).

Since the Cox model is a proportional hazards model it is important to examine if
the hazards are distributed proportionally. If the hazards are not distributed

proportionally, the estimates of all the covariates in the model couldbe biased, not simply
the offending variable. I follow the lead of Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001) and
examine the proportionality assumption by testing the scaled Schoenfeld residuals. There
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was no evidence of non-proportionality within the model. Furthermore, since two TVCs

were included in the model, it is advisable to estimate the model using robust standard
errors. We utilize robust standard errors, clustering the estimates by state as there are
theoretical reasons to assume that the standard errors among a state will be related while
those across states will not (Buckley and Westerland 2004).
Any analysis of this kind has similar problems as Jacobson (1990, 2007)

documented with campaign spending in congressional elections; namely, that the main
causal variable is potentially endogenous. Campaign spending is hypothesized to have an
effect on judicial tenure, but judicial tenure likely causes some variation in campaign
spending. This effect should not be consistently linear. Individuals who have a long
judicial tenure likely have an easier time raising money than do individuals facing their

first election; however, judges with longer tenure may also be less likely to be opposed.
Following the advice of Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004), we simply acknowledge

that endogeneity could exist. They argue that omitting a possible causal variable can bias
the model more significantly than leaving in a possible endogenous variable.
Results

Figure 12 illustrates the mean judicial tenure of judges in both of the two selection
systems: partisan and non-partisan elections. The average justice in a partisan election
state will serve around two years less than their non-partisan elected counterpart.
Consistent with what is known of partisan elections in general, it could be that voters vote
on the basis of party identification, and when it is present, incumbents are at more of a
risk than in non-partisan elections.
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The estimation of the Cox model provides for direct comparisons in rates of
change across time within the model. In particular, our hazard model allows us to
"determine if a variable increases duration by looking at its effect on the baseline hazard
rate" (Shipan and Shannon 2003, 662). A variable with a negative coefficient signifies
that it decreases the hazard rate, while a positive coefficient connotes that the variable
increases the hazard rate. Stated somewhat differently, a negative coefficient indicates

there is a decreasing likelihood of a justice leaving the bench when compared to the
baseline hazard, while a positive coefficient means that there is an increasing likelihood
the justice will leave the bench compared to the baseline hazard rate. With time varying
covariates the interpretation is also intuitive. The dichotomous variable, which measures

previous electoral opposition, can be interpreted like the other dichotomous variables
within the model. A positive coefficient on the log of total spending would mean that as
spending increased so did the likelihood a justice would leave the bench.
Average Tenure Length by Method of Selection

11.92

Non-Partisan

Partisan

Years

Figure 12. Average tenure length by method of selection.
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Table 6 displays the results of the estimated model along with the change in the
relative hazard rates for each variable. The relative change in the hazard rate is calculated
eB(xi=X1)_eB(xi=X2)

via the equation: %A/i(t) = [

, _y •>

1 x 100, where Xi takes on one value of

the independent variable and X2 takes on another value of the independent variable.

When calculating with dichotomous variables this means the quantity changes from 1 to
0. When calculating the change in the relative hazard rate for the total spending variable
we choose to use the mean and one standard deviation below.

The results of the model are not what would be anticipated following the

reasoning of the judicial reformers. Most importantly, contrary to their claims, spending

in campaigns has no statistically significant effect on the hazard rate ofjudges. This
means that judges who run uncontested, and thus spend no money and judges who are in

races where a substantially large amount of money is spent have statistically similar
hazard rates.

More simply, the amount spent in campaigns has no effect on how long an
individual serves on the bench. Figure 13 shows the effect of campaign spending on the
incumbent's probability of leaving the bench. Three plots, plotted at the minimum,
mean, and maximum show that there is no statistically significant difference across the
levels of spending. Indeed, in this sample, the direction is actually reversed. As the
overall campaign spending increases, incumbents appear to be less likely to leave the
bench.

The other time varying covariate in the model, whether or not an individual was
opposed in the previous election, also fails to meet statistical significance. At first this
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seems counterintuitive; obviously, individuals who are contested in an election should be

more likely to leave the bench than an individual who runs unopposed. This analysis
however does not examine such events as a cross-section, but instead analyzes the time
period in which a judge serves on the bench. This finding states that individuals who ran
unopposed and individuals who ran in a contested election have statistically similar
hazard rates.
Table 6

Cox Proportional Hazard Model of the Duration ofJudicial Tenure

Variable

Log of Total Spending
(TVC)

Estimate (s.e)

Change in Hazard Rate

-.006(.009)

-3.5%

.120(.133)

12%

.5870291)*

80%

.221(.274)

-20%

Gender

-.197(.267)

•18%

Minority

1.050274)'

186%

.485(.259)

-38%

Opposed in Prev. Election
(TVC)
Partisan Election

Retirement Age

Justice Party
Log Likelihood = -243.5514
LRChi2 = 69.37
Prob>Chil=0.00

N=914

Scaled Schonfeld residual global test p>chi2 = 0.33
The continuous variables were calculated by a change in one standard deviation.
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Hazard Function by Log of Total Spending
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Figure 13. Cox Proportional Hazard Model of the duration of judicial tenure.
While the main explanatory variables do not reach statistical significance within
the model, two of the control variables have a substantial impact on the hazard rate of

judges in state courts of last resort. First, the variable for partisan elections is statistically
significant and positively signed. Substantively, the effect of this variable signifies that
judges in partisan election systems as opposed to their counterparts in non-partisan
election systems have a higher hazard rate at any point during their career until they leave
the bench. During partisan judges' careers, they are 80% more likely to leave the bench

than a non-partisan judge. This lends credence to the claim that partisan systems
distribute more risk to their judges than do non-partisan systems. As can be seen in
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Figure 14, a judge in a partisan election system in her fifth year is as likely to leave the
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Figure 14. Hazard function by method of selection.
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The second interesting finding concerns the variable which measures minority
status. Minorities in both types of electoral systems have a much greater hazard rate than
non-minorities. Minority judges are 186%) more likely to leave the bench in the same year

as non-minority judges. Hurwitz and Lanier (2003) argued that the method of selection
ofjudges does not affect the number of minorities which reach the bench. It seems that

perhaps while the method of selection may have no effect on how often minorities reach
the bench, it could be a distinct likelihood that it has an effect on how quickly they leave.

Figure 15 displays the hazard function for both minorities and non-minorities.
Amazingly, minority judges at year five are at more of a risk to leave the bench that a
non-minority judge at any point in their tenure. Examining the data closer, a possible
explanation arises. While some individuals did serve over ten years, most individuals in
the sample joined the bench, often by interim nomination, and were either defeated in the
following election, or forced to retire because of the mandatory retirement age.
Conclusion

Judicial reformers have made many claims regarding judicial elections in the past

years. Some have sound empirical basis. Judicial elections have, in fact, become more

expensive (justiceatstake.org 2010) and retention elections are more independent
institutions than contested elections (Curry and Hurwitz 2010). However, many of their
claims are not supported by the analysis of this study.

Notably, claims that, "State judicial elections have transformed during the past
decade" (justiceatstake.org 2010), disregard the significant sums of money that were

spent in the 1990s and before injudicial contests. In the 1990 election for chiefjustice in
Texas, a combined total of $2,571,532 was spent. Again, in a different race in 1994, a
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total of $2,947,743 was spent by candidates in Texas. Expensive campaigns for judicial
elections are not a new phenomenon. Judicial elections have been high-cost affairs for

some time in certain states. When groups look only at aggregate numbers, they miss
important trends.

Furthermore, when the reform groups claim increased spending in judicial

campaigns is eroding away the legitimacy and independence ofjudges, the corollary must
be acknowledged: justices must also be becoming more accountable. However, when the
data is examined, we find that money has no discernible effect on judicial tenure.
Contrary to the theoretical underpinnings of the reform groups, it appears as

though increased campaign spending does not make judges more accountable. Judges
who run unopposed and judges who run in expensive contested elections have

statistically similar hazard rates. They are at near equal risk of leaving the bench at the
same time.

This finding ultimately though has no bearing on the claim that in a one-shot

examination of judicial elections money may predict electoral defeat. It is probable that
when significant sums of money are spent in an individual election, the incumbent judge
will be more likely to lose. This research, however, is not designed as a cross-sectional
examination. By examining judicial careers empirically, taking into account the time a
judge serves on a court I am declaring that during an individual's judicial tenure
campaign spending does not affect his time served when compared to others. In a crosssectional examination, the effect of money may be more pronounced.

Similarly, I find that whether or not a judge has been opposed in a previous
election has no bearing on judicial tenure when compared to others who were unopposed.
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As with campaign spending, this is not to say that in a one-shot game judges who are
opposed in an election are equally likely to leave the bench as someone who is
unopposed. Indeed, that situation is extremely unlikely. The claim made in this analysis
is that over the course of a judge's tenure on a state court of last resort, her being
previously opposed or unopposed has no bearing on the length of her comparative
judicial tenure.

There are two variables that do reach statistical significance and as such, affect

judicial tenure on a court. First, consistent with previous analyses (Curry and Hurwitz
2010), judges in partisan elections are more likely to leave the bench at any time than
those in other selection systems. Considering that the only real institutional difference

between these two types of systems is the fact that judges appear on ballots either with or
without their party identification, it can be reasoned that this signal alone increases the

risk to partisan judges. It would seem that serving as a judge in a system which places
either an "R" or "D" next to your name on the ballot increases your relative risk of
leaving the bench by 80%.

Second, individuals who are minorities in both selection systems are at a much

greater risk of leaving the bench. Judges who are non-White are over 180% more at risk
of leaving the bench than their White counterparts. While it seems that the type of
selection method does not affect whether minorities will reach the bench (Hurwitz and

Lanier 2003), it is clear that these judges, once they reach the bench in contested electoral
systems, depart more quickly than non-minority judges.

While total spending does not have an effect on judicial tenure, the analysis of
judicial tenure and judicial careers is in its infancy. As more scholars begin to examine
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the determinants ofjudicial careers, we will learn in great detail the true contours of
judicial tenure, not only in states with judicial elections, but all among judiciaries in the
states. All should follow the lead of Melinda Gann Hall (2001a) when she stated,

This study is only the first that seeks to unravel the fascinating and
complicated nexus between democratic processes and career decisions in
the states' highest courts. Countless questions remain [and] further
inquiry will be fruitful, especially for examining and perhaps dispelling
myths surrounding the politics of institutional design. (1136)
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CHAPTER V

STRATEGIC RETIREMENTS OF ELECTED AND APPOINTED JUSTICES IN
STATE SUPREME COURTS: A HAZARD MODEL APPROACH

Introduction

When examining the landscape of state courts of last resort, certainly one of the
most impressive factors concerns the amount of variation by which they select their
judges. In the states, judges are chosen for their high courts by methods that include
partisan elections, non-partisan elections, gubernatorial appointment, legislative
elections, and the Missouri Plan, often referred to by its advocates as the merit system.
While it is clear that each of these methods of selection places different pressures on the

justices when seeking the bench, these systems also vary with how judges retain their
seats on the court. While judges in some states must stand for re-election, other judges
need only receive the confidence of either a governor or legislature in order to serve an

additional term. Though different justices may have careers of various lengths, all their
careers are ultimately finite. The decision whether to end a career is often coupled with
the decision of how to end it.

The question of why and how state supreme court justices end their careers can

have a plethora of answers. Depending on the method of selection and retention, judges

departing the bench can lose a primary or general election, lose a retention election, be
impeached, fail to be retained by either the governor or the legislature, be nominated to
the federal bench, be forced to retire because of age limits, retire voluntarily, or die. Only
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one of the possibilities listed above occurs because of an active choice by the justice in

question: voluntarily retiring27. It seems highly unlikely a judge would chose to lose an
election, be forced off the bench because he met retirement age, or pass away. These

options for leaving the bench require positive action on behalf of another party or are

simply not controlled directly by the justices. The choice to retire is the only logical
action that can be carried out unilaterally by the individual justice. However, the reason

behind a judge's choice to leave the bench voluntarily does not take place in a vacuum.
The decision to leave the bench could be influenced in part by the institutional

arrangements that coincide with the method of selection. If justices wish to retire
strategically, the rules of the institutions that surround them should influence the
reason(s) why they leave the bench.

When a justice leaves the bench, for any reason, it creates a situation in which the
very nature of how law is interpreted may ultimately change. When a new justice joins
the bench, her ideology and written opinions supplant that which would have existed had

the previous justice not left. To study retirements from the bench is to examine how law
changes over time. In the case of strategic retirement, this requires the justice to be
forward-looking, and acknowledge her role in the interpretation of the law. Finding
evidence of strategic retirement would mean that justices, even in state courts, care not

only about their legacies, but also are concerned with who replaces them.

Strategic retirement at the federal judiciary is a topic that has been examined
thoroughly (see, e.g., Barrow and Zuk 1990; Danelski 1965; Hagle 1993; Spriggs and

27 If a judge were to turn down a federal promotion, it would be a voluntary action. However, because of
the rarity of said occurrences, they are not considered in this chapter.
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Wahlbeck 1995; Squire 1988; Vining, Zorn, and Smelcer 2006).28 It is generally
hypothesized that, all things being equal, Article III judges with effective lifetime tenure
will retire when an ideologically congruent president can nominate their replacement.

The theory behind this behavior is quite obvious, and follows eloquently from the

expectations of rational choice theory. Judges prefer to retire under conditions by which

their own ideology will remain represented on the bench after they have left. By retiring
when an ideologically similar president is in office, the judge has her best opportunity to
achieve that goal.

Among the states, the institutional mechanisms ofjudicial selection and

replacement are significantly more varied than at the federal level. States that select their
judges by a method of appointment have much in common with the federal court system.
These states generally have the initial selection and retention left to either the governor
or, in rare instances, the legislature. States that employ the Missouri Plan allow their

governors to select the justices (albeit after the work of a nominating commission), while
providing the public the opportunity to retain them at the polls. Due to the important role

of the governor in the Missouri Plan, this method of selection still allows the option for a
justice to retire in such a manner as to ensure her replacement will have the highest
likelihood of being ideologically consistent.

However, states that employ popular elections to select their judges bear little
resemblance to the federal judiciary or those states that use an appointment method for
their initial selection. Strategic retirement can occur under a variety of methods of

28There also is much research on career decisions in the U.S. Congress, from which much of the literature
on retirements in the judiciary relies (see, e.g., Brace 1985; Frantzich 1978; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994;
Hall and van Houweling 1995; Hibbing 1982; Schlesinger 1966).
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selection, though the motivation may not always be similar. While it appears that federal
justices retire strategically from the bench, the question in this chapter is, do justices at
the state level behave similarly, and considering the variation in the methods of selection,

is their reasoning the same? In this chapter I engage in an examination of whether

judicial selection systems influence state supreme court justices to employ strategic
behavior when retiring.
Theoretical Expectations

The assumption that federal judges engage in strategic behavior was not always a
dominant theory in political science. When Murphy (1964) first published his work
explaining the possible ways in which members of the United States Supreme Court
could behave strategically, it did not become a dominant paradigm within the field.
Indeed, while Rohde and Spaeth (1976) published their initial formulation of the
attitudinal model that was based in part on strategic behavior, this motivation was

dropped in later iterations (see, e.g., Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002).
Largely emerging in the 1990s, accounts of strategic behavior began to move

back into the lexicon of judicial politics scholars. Using data and statistical procedures
not readily available prior to this time, many scholars harkened back to the work of
Murphy (1964) to examine and explain how strategic interaction was a theoretically
motiving factor injudicial behavior. Indeed, we would come to learn that U.S. Supreme
Court justices engage in strategic behavior in many aspects of their jobs, including

opinion assignment, coalition formation, and opinion drafting (Maltzman, Spriggs, and
Wahlbeck 2000), as well as the decision on the merits (Epstein and Knight 1998; but see
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Segal and Spaeth 2002). Other scholars made similar findings with respect to behavior
on the Courts of Appeals (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006; Van Winkle 1997).
Notable works have also been published on strategic interaction among state

supreme court judges. For instance, Langer (2002) used a separation of powers model to
examine the conditions under which state supreme court justices would be willing to

engage in judicial review and overturn the acts of state legislatures. She found that
justices act accordingly as they consider not only the likelihood of reprisal in terms of
their retention, but also the likelihood their decisions will be overturned by the legislature

in question. Hall (1987, 1992) analogously found that justices in the ideological minority
in states that use popular elections modify their votes on salient issues so as to increase
their chances for re-election.

If state supreme court justices are forward-looking rational actors as these studies
imply, then their strategic calculations should not necessarily be limited to decisions

concerning the dispensation of cases. Indeed, it seems likely that the justices also might
behave strategically when making decisions based on their careers as well. The decision
concerning when and under what conditions to leave the bench should provide another
opportunity for strategic behavior.

The theory underlying the research on strategic retirement in the U.S. Supreme

Court claims that a justice will be more likely to retire when the president and to a lesser
degree the Senate are of the same political party as the justice (Hagle 1993). That is,
since the justices wish to maximize their policy preferences in the disposition of cases

(Segal and Spaeth 1992, 2002), they similarly desire to be replaced by an ideologically
analogous justice. Studies of the retirement of justices in the federal courts have mixed
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results with regard to their hypothesized strategic nature. Hagle (1993) used an event
count model to find that there are possible political (strategic) motivations for justice

retirement. Spriggs and Wahlbeck (1995) found that appeals court judges retire when
conditions favorably allow for a replacement with a similar ideological perspective.

However, employing a competing risks duration model, Zorn and Van Winkle (2000)
found no evidence that strategic motivation influences retirements on the Supreme Court.
While the evidence at the federal level is mixed, the idea behind strategic judicial

retirements has theoretic appeal, even as applied to state courts. In particular, states that

utilize gubernatorial appointment or legislative selection are comparable to the federal
system, in that the existence of these institutions allow forjustices to anticipate the
likelihood that an ideologically similar replacement would be selected. Therefore, the

mechanisms exist in both gubernatorial appointment and legislative election systems for
state justices to make strategic calculations and retire in a particular way.

While legislative electoral and gubernatorial appointment systems are analogous
to the federal system, they both have an institutional feature which is significantly
different. Most appointment systems in the states do not feature lifetime tenure and

therefore, justices must face retention following the length of their term. Their retention
may depend upon an institution which is ideologically incongruent with the justice's
jurisprudence. Langer (2002) argued that while this situation can be contentious, most
justices facing this situation will behave in a fashion so as not to call attention or
retribution from either the governor or legislator. Theywill do this by operating in what
she termed the "safetyzone," where the justices will be less likely to engage in judicial
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review or negatively treat legislation passed during their term. In this case, their retention
will be much less likely to factor into their strategic calculation of retirement.

Of course, only a few states employ selection systems analogous to the federal
system. Yet, states employing non-appointive methods of selection enable a different
form of strategic retirement calculation. States that use popular elections to a large

degree preclude the retiringjustice from knowing the likelihood an ideological similar
judge will replace them. For example, open seat elections for state supreme courts are a
function of the candidates themselves, the electoral context, the value of the seat, and the

institutional arrangements (Bonneau 2006). This provides the sitting justice with far
more uncertainty than a federaljustice considering retirement. Furthermore, Hall (2001a)

claimed that judges in popular election states can retire strategically, although the
motivation is different than that for individuals on the federal bench. Borrowing theory

from research on U.S. House Elections (Brace 1984, 1985), Hall claimed that justices in
states that use elections can retire strategically only by leaving the bench when they are

facing a probable electoral defeat. In her study Hall found evidence of strategic
retirement in partisan and retention elections, but not in non-partisan elections.
Interim appointments do exist in most states with partisan and non-partisan

elections. In these cases, the governor can appoint a new justice who will have to stand
for election as the incumbent in the next cycle, usually in the same year. Unlike those

justices in appointment systems, a justice wishing to install an ideologically similar
justice faces a significant deficiency. The seat would only be guaranteed for eight
months because of the nature of the elections cycle. If the justice retired because she felt

it was likely they would lose in the following election, it is probable that the new
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incumbent would suffer a similar fate29. Some states however do grant a significant
advantage to mid-term appoints. Some states (in my sample Oregon and Michigan),
justices appointed to replace a retirement are listed on the ballot as the incumbent.
Knowing the strong incumbency advantage that exist in non-partisan elections when
incumbency is listed on the ballot (Schaffner, Streb, Wright 2001), I anticipate that

justices in systems that allow mid-term appointments to be listed with incumbent, will be
less likely to retire following a close election.

What about the Missouri Plan, which uses aspects of both appointment and

elections? Should we expect justices in that type of selection system to behave more

similarly to judges in appointive systems (where the ideology of the governor is a critical
motiving factor); or instead, would they be most influenced by the likelihood of a defeat
in their retention elections? I argue that justices facing retention elections in Missouri

Plan systems are more likely to behave like justices in appointment systems rather in

electoral systems. Hall (2001a) examined retention elections and found that justices in
those systems had the propensity to behave like justices in electoral systems when
retiring. However, she did not examine their propensity to retire in situations where

ideological congruence would allow a similar successor. I argue that while these justices
must account to the public in retention elections, they are likely aware of the institutions
within which they work. That is, despite the media attention surrounding the retention
elections in Iowa in 2010 in which several justices failed to retain their seats on the

bench, the reality is that sitting justices run an extremely low risk of electoral defeat in

29 It may be the case thatjustices in electoral systems are more likely to retire when they fear they are going
to lose the next election and there is an ideological congruent governor present, though that condition is not
examined in this project.

120

retention elections (Hall 2001b; see also Curry and Hurwitz 2010, who found that justices
in retention elections have the longest tenure rates compared to those in appointive or

electoral systems).30 Consequently, we should not anticipate that retention elections are a
significant motivatorin terms of justices' retirement decisions. Since justices in states

utilizing the Missouri Plan realize that the probability of defeat in retention elections is

extremely low, forward-looking jurists should be unmoved by having to run in retention
elections. Instead, based on these institutional arrangements they should be more similar

to justices in states with gubernatorial appointment, such that that they are unlikely to
retire when a member of the opposite political party occupies the governorship. Indeed,

while Hall (2001a) found that justices may strategically retire in retention elections as
their ideological distance from the electorate increases, she also finds that partisan

congruence with the governor has a larger statistical effect on retirements. That is, the
likelihood of retirement should increase for justices in merit systems when the governor
is of the same party.

My hypotheses are dependent upon whether a justice serves in an appointive or

merit system on the one hand, or in an electoral system on the other. If a judge serves in

a gubernatorial appointment system, legislative selection system, or Missouri system with
a retention election, the only pragmatic way to retire strategically is to leave when the
replacing institution is of a similar ideology:

HI: Justices in states with gubernatorial appointment, legislative selection,
or retention elections are more likely to retire when the respective
appointive body (governor or legislature) is ideologically similar.
30 But seeDudley (1997), who did not find any significant differences in turnover across the various
methods of selection. His analysis, however, did not contain control variables, nor did it examine the
potential influences on a justice's decision to retire.
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However , if the justice's retention is dependent upon a partisan, non-partisan, or hybrid
electoral system (but not a retention election), strategic retirement should come when a
justice perceives an electoral threat:

H2a: Justices in states with partisan, non-partisan, or hybrid electoral
systems are more likely to retire when the probabilityof electoral defeat
increases.

H2b: Justices in states with partisan, non-partisan, or hybrid electoral
systems are more likely to retire when their ideological distance from the
electorate increases.

Data and Methods

I have collected data on the length of tenure for every individual state supreme

courtjustice who served in one of eighteen states from 1980 to 2005. States are
categorized as employing one of the following selection and retention systems:

1) appointment, whether gubernatorial or legislative; 2) Missouri Plan; 3) partisan
election; 4) non-partisan election; or 5) hybrid election. Sixteen of these states were

selectedbecause they incorporate classic features of appointive systems, merit systems,

partisan elections, and non-partisan elections, all without significant modification.
Four states from each of these systems were randomly chosen so that all of the

categories would be equally represented. I also included two additional states, Michigan
and Ohio, because they are hybrid electoral systems, with traits of both partisan and non

partisan elections, and traits fully unique to themselves (Easter 2011). In Michigan, the
party organizations themselves nominate the candidates in party conventions; however,
the candidates appear on the general election ballot without a party identification. In
Ohio, the candidates are initially selected in partisan primaries, but the general elections
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are non-partisan contests (Hurwitz 2010). Table 7 displays the states I analyzed and their

respective methods of selection, as well as the number of justices and departures for each
state for the time period examined.
Table 7

Descriptive Statistics
States

Method of Selection

Number of

Number of

Justices

Retirements

Electoral Systems:
Alabama

Partisan Election

31

15

Louisiana

Partisan Election

18

9

Texas

Partisan Election

43

22

West Virginia

Partisan Election

19

10

Kentucky

Non-partisan Election

20

7

Oregon

Non-partisan Election

24

15

Washington

Non-partisan Election

28

15

Wisconsin

Non-partisan Election

18

9

Michigan

Hybrid Election

20

10

Ohio

Hybrid Election

23

10

Iowa

Missouri Plan

20

12

Kansas

Missouri Plan

18

10

Oklahoma

Missouri Plan

18

9

Nebraska

Missouri Plan

19

10

Maine

Gubernatorial Appointment

22

11

New Jersey

Gubernatorial Appointment

19

12

South Carolina

Legislative Election

14

8

Virginia

Legislative Election

17

12

401

206

Appointive Systems:

Totals
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I utilized two different statistical models, with each testing a specific hypothesis.

Consequently, the causal variables are different with each model, since each grouping of
judicial selection systems allows forjudges to retire strategically in different ways. In

systems that utilize appointments, I utilized the partisan identification of the judge and
the party identification of the party in power of the institution in charge of the nomination
31

to create a dichotomous measure of partisan agreement .

For states with popular election I developed a coding scheme to measure a close

electoral victory. For states which do not use blanket electoral systems, elections in
which the incumbent received less than 55% were coded as having a close election; a

coding scheme that comports with the categorizations used in general electoral studies.
In electoral systems which utilize blanket elections to election justices, a close election
was determined by taking the average expected distribution of the vote and adding three.

For example, if five candidates were running we would expect an even distribution of
20% vote share. Therefore, individuals who won receiving less than 24% of the vote are

coding as having a close election. I also employ a similar ideological distance measure as
that used in the appointments model. The ideological distance used is the absolute value
of the justices' PAJID score, and the Berry ideology score for the electorate.
While keenly interested in how selection systems condition retirements, I

acknowledge that individuals may retire for reasons unrelated to the risks leviedupon
them because of the institution system in which they serve. I therefore include other
measures intended to control for conditions that may cause individuals to retire. First,

31 Ideally, I would use the same measure that is used in the elections model, but the specific Berry et al.
scores do not accurately measure the ideology of the nominating institution, but the government as a whole,
therefore, the measure would not actually measure the desired concept.

124

there are personal characteristics of the justice that may cause them to retire. An age
variable is included as individuals are more likely to retire as they get older.
Additionally, while there are inconsistent findings concerning gender and
minority status with respect to their likelihood of serving on a court of last resort, a few
analyses have considered their effect on the tenure length ofjustices (see Curry and
Hurwitz 2010), and thus I include such variables here for purposes of model
specification.

Second, institutional characteristics may affect the likelihood of a justice to retire.

I control for Missouri Plan systems, as justices in these systems have statistically longer
tenures than justices in all other selection systems (Curry and Hurwitz 2010). States also
have various term lengths. Justices in states with longer term lengths may retire later
than those with shorter terms, since they have to undergo their retention process less

often. Judicial salary may also have an influence, and thus control for that as well. The
raw salary of the justice was used. These data come from the Annual Survey of Judicial
Salaries (1980-2005) authorized by the National Center for State Courts.
Furthermore, justices may be more likely to retire as their workload increases. A

simple total of disposed cases by the state supreme court were used to measure this
variable. These data were also obtained from the Court Statistics Project, also run by the
National Center for State Courts (NCSC 2011). In some states that utilize elections
candidates do not run statewide, but instead for district seats on the state courts of last

resort. Acknowledging that incumbents in these districts may be less likely to lose an

election given the smaller geographic area and close ties to a community, a dichotomous
variable for district representation was included in the model. Finally, two states in the
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elections sample, Oregon and Michigan, allow mid-term appointments to be listed on the
ballot as incumbents. In order to control for the advantage being listed as the incumbent

may give a retiring justice, I include a dichotomous variable to control for the ballot
effects in these two states.

There may be issues of observational equivalence when identifying a strategic

retirement. The statistical analysis attempts to identify, and control for other alternative
factors that may influence a justice's likelihood of retirement. However, even with
various controls, an individual retiring under strategic conditions, may not be retiring for
strategic motivations. As with any study of individuals, it is difficult to control for all

other possible variables. I feel that those I have identified would be the most likely
culprits in causing individuals to retire, and by controlling for them, I claim the variable
of interest (depending on the model) is accurately influencing the probability of strategic
behavior.

The appropriate statistical method to analyze data of this sort is an event history
model, also known as a hazard model (Collett 2003). There are a number of hazard
models from which to choose, based on the assumptions of the model and the data

utilized. The model I opted to employ for the appointment systems is a Cox proportional
hazard model (hereafter, "Cox models"). There are two reasons why this model

specification is appropriate for the question being asked. First, a proportional hazards
model makes no assumption concerning the distributional form of the duration
dependency. Since my theory does not assume the duration dependency takes a specific
functional form, the Cox model is more robust. Second, unlike the elections models

which have two predominant ways by which justices leave the bench, only an extremely
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small minority ofjustices leave the bench in appointment systems by another means than

retirement32. Thus, the Cox proportional hazard model is most appropriate for this
question (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Cox 1972).

In order to identify a Cox hazard model, the analyst must first assess the

proportionality of hazard rates across different values of the independent variables. "The
Cox Model assumes that the hazard function of any two individuals with different values
on one or more covariates differ only by a factor or proportionality" (Box-Steffensmeier

and Zorn 2001, 974). If this assumption does not hold true, the estimates of all the
covariates in the model could be biased, not just the offending variables. Following the
lead of Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, I examined the assumption of proportionality by

testing the scaled Schoenfeld residuals, and found no evidence of non-proportionality.
The model estimated for justices injudicial election states follows the same event

history motivation but differs with regards to choice of statistical method used. Justices
in electoral states leave the bench in primarily two ways, retirement and losing an

election. This demands a modeling choice that will estimate a hazard model for each

type of event and allow the coefficients of the variables to differ across each type of
event. While a stratified Cox Model will estimate different baseline hazards for each

type of event, it does not allow the coefficients to vary for each event type. BoxSteffensmeier and Jones (2004) recommended using a particular specification of a

multinomial logit (MNL) model for this type of competing risk. They stated,
As a method to account for complications posed by competing risks, the
MNL model is an attractive choice for much the same reasons the binary

32 Out of the 93 justices in our sample, only 9 leave by other means. One justice lost a retention election,
six justices were nominated to the federal bench, and two justices passed away. These justices are
considered right censored for this analysis.
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logic model is chosen in the context of single-way transitions models. It
may be estimated by maximum likelihood and the parameters are
interpretable as logit coeffecients (p. 173).
The multinomial logit is estimated as a series of linked logit functions which
allows the coefficients for each event to be compared directly with each other. The

baseline category is that of a non-event; in this context, an individual serving for another
year. Temporal dependence is handled in this model by including the log of the duration
as a control variable.

A MNL model employed in an event history context must meet the same
conditions as in other contexts, namely that it meets the assumption of independence of
irrelevant alternatives. In the event history context this is also known as the assumption

of independent risks. By using a MNL one assumes that the baseline hazards for each

type of k events are independent. This means I assume that the baseline hazard rate for
retirements is different from that of losing an election. In this context, the data-

generating process creates a circumstance where the three categories analyzed in this
MNL context are theoretically discrete and independent. The decision to serve another

term (the baseline category) is a positive action on behalf of the justice, while losing an
election is not. Furthermore, the decision to retire, while it may be conditioned by the

assumption one may lose an election, is unaffected by an electoral loss, indeed retirement
cannot occur after electoral defeat. I statistically test this assumption using the Hausman
test and found no evidence of dependent risks (Long 1997).

Employing event history models to examine temporally ordered data has a rich
history in political science (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004), including research
on judicial politics. For instance, Shipan and Shannon (2003) used a hazard model to
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examine the duration of Supreme Court nominations and confirmation, while Langer
et al. (2003) applied hazard models to analyze how associate justices on state supreme

courts select their chief justices. From a methodological perspective this chapter is
analogous to these studies.

When dealing with hazard models, issues of left truncation and right censoring

become apparent. Left truncation occurs when an individual in the dataset joined the risk
pool prior to the first observation. In this study it means a justice was selected for a

judicial position at some point before I begin the analysis in 1980. These individuals do
not enter at t=0, because the records allow us to know when their tenure first began as a

Supreme Court justice. Thus, a justice may have been unobserved for 8 years of prior
tenure, but when she enters the risk pool at the beginning of the analysis we code the data

as if she began her tenure at t=9, thus solving any left truncation issues. Right censoring
occurs when a justice continues to serve after the end of the observation period in 2005.

In event history analysis, this circumstance is not problematic, because we are interested
in the occurrence and non-occurrence of an event, in these cases retirements or lost

elections, during the period of analysis. That is, individuals who are coded as left
truncated in the data contribute information to the model at the point they become

observed, while right censored data contribute information to the model until they are no
longer observed (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

Finally, when estimating the Cox model appointment systems, it is appropriate to
cluster the standard errors based upon the state. This allows for variation between the
states to be controlled for. The MNL approach allows for the use of a simple robust
sandwich estimator to solve for possible deviations in the standard errors.
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Results

Before examining the systematic causes of judicial retirements, it is helpful to
know the conditions under which justices retire. Table 8 displays the descriptive
conditions under which individuals justices in both merit and electoral systems left the

bench. Justices in appointment systems (a category which include gubernatorial

appointments, legislative elections and the Missouri Plan) were more likely to retire
under a condition where their successor could be chosen by a like-minded individual
or body.

This lends credence to the hypothesis that judges in these systems are likely to

behave strategically in their retirement. Justices in electoral systems (partisan elections,
non-partisan elections, and hybrid elections), however, do not appear to retire

strategically, as many more justices retire after a large electoral victory, not a close
victory as anticipated. Furthermore, justices who face a previous close election, are more
likely to depart the bench by losing the following election.
Table 8

Departure Conditions
Electoral Systems

Appointment Systems
Retirements
Different

Parties
Same Parties

Retirements

Electoral Loss

34

Large Win

89

11

50

Close Win

33

16

122

27

84

33 Appointment systems include states that employ gubernatorial appointments, legislative selection, and
the Missouri Plan, while electoral systems include states that utilize partisan elections, non-partisan
elections, and hybrid elections (Michigan and Ohio). See Table 7 for details.
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It is now appropriate to present the statistical model for appointive systems to
examine whether or not these descriptive results are systematic in nature. The findings of
the full hazard model for appointments are contained in Table 9. My hypothesis that

justices of the same ideology as the appointing authority are more likely to retire is

supported by the analysis, as the Ideological Agreement variable obtains statistical

significance and is correctly signed. This signifies that individualjustices in merit-based
and other appointive systems are more likely to retire when there is a high likelihood that
their replacement shares their policy preferences. Justices selected and retained by these
various forms of appointment are likely to engage in strategic behavior when it comes to
retirement.34
Table 9

Cox Proportional Hazards Modelfor Appointment Systems
Variable

Estimate (s.e)

Term Length

-.019 (.027)

Gender

- .802 (.250)*

Minority

.508 (.210)*

Age

.007 (.002)*

Salary

8.24 (.3.78)*

Workload

-.000 (.001)

Ideological Agreement

.022 (.013)

*

Log Likelihood = -293.501
LRChi2 = 984.67
Prob>Chil=0.00
N = 1548

Scaled Schonfeld residual global test p>chi2 = 0.77

34 Theuse of the ideological difference variable provided an insignificant finding. I believe this is because
the Berry et al. (1998) scores measure the entire government's ideological standing, not a specific
institution, be it governor or legislature, which this analysis calls for. Thus, I only include the Ideological
Agreement Variable in the model while dropping the Ideological Difference variable, since the latter does
not measure what I am seeking to operationalize.
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A number of the control variables also proved influential. In particular, age is a

dominant variable in the model. As a justice's age increases, she is more likely to retire,
an intuitive and obvious finding, as age is a critical factor for any individual's decision to

cease working. Thus, it is clear that this variable needs to be included to ensure the
model is not under-specified. Even so, when age is included in the model, the key
variable of interest, ideological agreement, remains significant, demonstrating its
importance to this issue of retirement in appointive selection systems.

Two personal variables, gender and minority, significantly affect retirement in
appointive systems, but in opposite directions. Women are more likely to stay in office

longer until their retirement, while minorityjustices are more likely to retire from the
bench more quickly.

Finally, salary is the one institutional control variable that is statistically

significant in the model. As salary increases, individuals are more likely to leave the
bench. This variable is likely absorbing some variation that would normally be attributed

to age, as salary generally increases over time with age, and there is no sound theoretical
reason to assume that higher salaries cause individuals to retire from the bench.

Interestingly, term length and workload have no influence on retirements in appointive
systems.

In the MNL models for justices in states which utilize electoral selection methods
there is also evidence of strategic behavior. As evidenced by Table 4,1 find that

ideological distance from the electorate is a strong predictor of retirement, even when
controlling for numerous other factors. Indeed, an ideological distance increase by a
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factor of one unit increases an individual's likelihood of retiring over losing an election
by 95%.
Table 4

Multinomial Logit Duration Modelfor Electoral Systems

Variable

Retirements

Electoral Defeats

Odds of R

Odds of E

over E

over R

1.24 (.443)*

Close Election

.334 (.217)

Ideological Dist.

.041 (.015)*

-.057 (.044)

1.06

Age

.104 (.020)*

.006 (.031)

LOO

Workload

.000(.000)

.000 (.000)

Salary

-7.91 (4.01)*

-4.38 (8.39)

Ballot Incumbent

-.064 (.227)

-2.24(1.05)*

Term Length

-.069 (.058)

-.089 (.129)

District

-.593 (.326)*

-.391 (.786)

Gender

-.114(377)

-.177 (.604)

Minority

.345 (.495)

.711 (.569)

Log (Duration)

.519 (.164)

.154 (.272)

-9.52(1.16)*

-4.39(2.17)

Constant

3.46

1.01

.901

.430

Log Likelihood =-532.731
Chi2= 133.25

Prob>Chi2 = 0.00
N = 2048

Figure 16 displays the predictable probability of retirement or losing an election
across the range of ideological distance values. Though the probability of leaving by
either method is close when the ideological distance is small, the probability of departing

by retirement increases linearly while the probability of leaving from an electoral defeat
remains flat. While close elections are not a statistically significant predictor for

retirement, it does obtain significance in the model estimated for those who lose
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elections. Therefore, justices who have endured a previous close election are 369% more

likely to lose their following election than retire. Figure 17 shows the probability of
leaving the bench either by retirement or losing an election given a previous close
election. While the probability remains consistent for retirements, the probability of
losing an election sharply increases.
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Figure 16. Predicted probability of competing risks by ideological distance.
One additional variable obtains statistical significance in the elections model.

Ballot incumbency significantly decreases the likelihood a justice will lose an election.

Knowing what we do of incumbency effects, this finding is not shocking. However, the
ballot incumbency does not reduce the likelihood of retirement. It could be the case that
incumbents may want to retire when they are risking electoral defeat and the governor is

134

of the same party. However, that occurrence is rare enough within my data to make
estimation difficult.
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Figure 17. Predicted probability for competing risks by previous election returns.
Three additional variables obtain statistical significance in the retirement model.
First, age is a significant factor in retirements from the bench. It seems intuitive to
assume that the older an individual is, the more likely he is to retire. Also, as the total
workload of the court increases, the likelihood of a justice departing the bench also

increases. Finally, having district-based elections is negatively related to the likelihood
an individual will retire from the bench. It is likely the fact that elections via districts

engender a closer tie between the elected official and the constituency than statewide
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elections. This likely makes the justices feel they have a safe seat, reducing the likelihood
of their voluntary retirement.
Discussion

The debate concerning the most appropriate method of selection for choosing
state supreme court justices is increasing in volatility at many levels, with some states

including South Carolina (Boniti 2011), Nevada (German 2009), Tennessee (Locker
2009), Michigan (Gilber 2010), and Wisconsin (Raftery 2011) discussing possible
changes to their selection mechanisms. Advocates for moving away from electoral
systems claim that systems that use an appointment mechanism, particularly the Missouri
Plan, will shield the justices from politics. The American Judicature Society claims,
Not only does merit selection ensure that only the most qualified
candidates become judges, but it also limits the influence of any one
political party or public official. In doing so, it frees judges from overt
political influence and promotes a fair and impartial judiciary. (AJS 2011)
Confirming some of the findings of Bonneau and Hall (2009), my results call into
question some of the claims of reformers. I find that judges in appointive systems,

including the Missouri Plan, are more likely to retire when the body charged with

selecting their replacement is ideologically compatible. Substantively, this means that
judges consider their own ideological proclivities as well as those of potential successor's
sufficiently important motivators when deciding whether to retire.

This is a keenly strategic, political action on the part of the retiring justice, and it
is not a decision that is free from overt political influence. The institutional nature of

these appointment systems that are designed in theory to shield judges from political
influences allows them to make strategic, political decisions surrounding retirement. In
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particular, retiring justices in appointive systems strategically seek to ensure that their
ideological preferences remain on the bench long after they have chosen to leave it.
Judges in electoral systems also engage in strategic behavior when choosing to
depart the bench. Strategic justices should not wish to lose an election, but instead
choose to retire from the bench on their own terms. Of the two variables I believe a

justice would use as indicators of a possible electoral defeat (ideological distance from
the electorate and previous close election), one obtained statistical significance,

indicating that justices do consider their electoral chances when deciding when to retire.
The claim that judges are apolitical diviners of the law finds little support in

empirical reality. Judges are political beings. Changing the method of selection and
retention forjudges does not change this reality, it merely changes the way in which the
strategic calculation will be conditioned. Ultimately, this chapter finds that justices in

state courts of last resort, regardless of the method of selection are likely to be forwardlooking, strategic actors when choosing to depart the bench.

The choices made by these justices when leaving the bench epitomizes the core
values each type of selection mechanism seeks to elicit. Justices in competitive electoral
systems who leave the bench because they fear losing an election are behaving in a

highly accountable fashion. Feeling that the electorate will remove them from office, the
justice chooses to retire, thereby educing the pinnacle value of the electoral mechanism;
accountability. Whereas, when justices in appointment systems leave the bench

strategically, they are doing so to further judicial independence from the electorate. By
maintaining the ideological balance within the judicial office, the departing justice is
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advocating for a consistent jurisprudence from the bench, one of the hallmarks ofjudicial
independence.

Both types of systems give the justices within them the institutional means to
engage in strategic behavior when leaving the bench. Strategic retirement in both
systems, whether intended or unintended by the institutional designers, ultimately serves

the desired values of the designers. Accountability and independence in the judicial
enterprise can be increased or decreased in significant ways by modifying the method of
selection, but one cannot remove politics from the judicial mind.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Beyond debates about the normative claims concerning the methods ofjudicial

selection used in state supreme courts, individuals often miss the reason why we should
care. Accountability and independence are not goals that exist in a vacuum. The concern
over the nature by which the states populate their courts of last resort stems from the

recognition that these justices make policy. Their decisions are binding precedent to the
citizens and lawmakers which reside within their state. The accountability versus

independence debate should be viewed in the terms of public policy. Do we want justices
to be relatively unrestrained in their ability to make policy or should they have to answer
to either the public or the other branches of government for their decisions?

The answers to these questions should affect the type of institutional mechanism
that is chosen to staff and retain state supreme courts. The length of judicial careers is
affected by the methods of selection and retention used in the various states. Indeed,
even the reasons justices choose to depart the bench are affected by these institutions.
The logical connection is that these methods used by the states have policy ramifications.
If they did not, groups like the AJS, ABA, and the Federalist Society would not have
lined on up different sides of the debate. The reality is that which method of selection a
state chooses has a direct relationship on Laswell's (1935), "who gets what, when, and
how."
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My interest on the length and determinants ofjudicial careers is not because I feel
there is a correct answer, but instead I feel there is a lack of empirical information and
evidence to inform the debate. While there exists much literature on the behavior of

justices on state supreme courts in terms of decisional output or electoral success, we still
know precious little about their careers. This is the reason I have attempted to fill this
gap in the literature.

The judicial reform movement generally motivates their claims from a normative
theoretical standpoint. Grasping an anachronism, long since disproven by waves of legal
realists and political scientists, these reformers cling tightly to the belief that judges

decide cases entirely based on 'the law35.' Eschewing empirical findings that date back
to at least Pritchett's work on The Roosevelt Court in 1948, these groups hold steadfast

that judicial behavior is a function of only the facts, the case, and the law.

Their critiques ofjudicial elections claim that if judges are made responsible to a
constituency and forced to campaign, then something else, beyond the law, may influence
their behavior on the bench. They disregard the empirical work which demonstrates that

judges are influenced by their ideologies even in a system which almost entirely removes
any type of accountability (Segal and Spaeth 2002). Furthermore, while they recognize
that judicial elections could have an effect on judicial decision-making, they fail to
acknowledge that so do appointment-based systems (see Langer 2002) and even their
favored Missouri Plan (see Brace and Hall 1990). In short, institutions matter for judicial
behavior in both electoral systems and appointment systems.

35 Pritchett (1968, 487) noted, "the [L]egal [RJealists, influenced bypragmatism, behavioral psychology,
psychoanalysis, and statistical sociology, sought reality in human behavior and judicial conduct. They
believed that judicial decision-making may be influenced by the 'hunches' of judges, and that close cases
are commonly decided on the basis of extra-legal factors."
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Before a true informed debate concerning methods ofjudicial selection can take

place, the institutional designers and policy advocates should collectively acknowledge
three concepts, which if not articulated serve to mislead the public. First, judges make
judicial decisions based on more inputs than merely the law, and while perhaps the
source of those inputs can be mitigated or changed, no institutional arrangement can
delete their existence. Second, institutions themselves have effects on the individuals that

work within them—even judges—and these too will affect judicial behavior. Finally,
judicial selection is a political process in any of the methods of selection currently in use.
Institutional designers or policy advocates who wish to change the method of

judicial selection generally have normative motivations, rarely backed by empirical
analysis. This dissertation has both a theoretical and policy motivation. Using the

starting point of neoinstitutionalism, I have sought to examine how the institutions which
are used to staff state courts of last resort affect the tenure length and behavior of

individual justices under varying political circumstances. While it remains to be seen if
the findings generated in this work will find the ears of those it seeks to inform, I have
done this research in hopes it will give empirical information to those who are involved
in the judicial selection debate.
Does Institutional Variation Matter?

Looking across each of the three empirical chapters there is one consistent story
being retold: the type of institution used to select state supreme court justices has
observable and measurable effects on judicial tenure. While justices in each of the
methods of selection used in the U.S. are charged with performing the same job, their
careers and behavior are quite different in observable and predictable ways. There are

146

three lessons which can be taken away from this study. First, institutions can have effects
that their creators did not anticipate, and are thus unintended. Second, while campaign
spending has an effect on the outcome of elections, it does not seem to have a direct

effect on the length ofjudicial careers. Lastly, strategic political behavior cannot be
removed by modifying a method of selection; it will only be channeled in a different way.
The Accountability of Retention Elections

It seems quite clear from the publications of groups like the American Judicature
Society and the American Bar Association that their intention for the Missouri Plan was
to create a system where selection was based on the merit qualifications of the individual,
while balancing the accountability function with regular retention elections. Describing
how justices are kept accountable in merit selections systems, the AJS states,
After an initial term of office, judges are evaluated on the basis of their
performance on the bench by the voters in an uncontested retention
election.. .This provides an opportunity to remove from office those who
do not fulfill their judicial responsibilities. (AJS 2012, 2)
When examining the empirical evidence, it becomes clear that justices in Missouri

Plan states are very rarely removed from office via these uncontested retention elections.

In my sample of four states from 1980 to 2005 which utilize the Missouri Plan, only one
justice was removed by retention elections. The Missouri Plan, when compared with
other methods of selection, has on average the longest tenure for its individual justices.
Even when controlling for numerous mitigating factors, justices whom are retained by
retention elections have an exceedingly low risk of removal by comparison to the other
systems. While some may claim this is because the merit system promotes the selection
of better-qualified candidates, empirical studies do not bear this out (see Choi, Gulati and
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Posner 2010). Empirical studies do show that the average voter during a retention

election has very little information about the incumbent, and if they choose to vote in the

contest, are making a generally uninformed decision (Klein and Baum 2001). While the
other two electoral systems serve their accountability function, I question whether the
nature of a retention election can as well.

Campaign Spending and Judicial Tenure

There can be little doubt that the amount of money spent injudicial campaigns

has drastically risen in the past twenty years. A myriad of studies demonstrate the effect
of campaign spending on electoral fortunes, even injudicial elections, generally finding
that campaign spending benefits the challenger more than it does the incumbent
(Bonneau 2007, Bonneau and Hall 2009).

Many of the reform groups however, are

making further claims about the effects of campaign spending. They have argued in
publications that along with increased campaign spending there is also a substantive

reduction injudicial independence. They claim that the low knowledge electorate is
energized by high amounts of campaign spending in the form of negative ads, and this in
turn increases the likelihood incumbents will lose. Examining the data, these

hypothesized patterns are not borne out. When controlling for numerous factors there is
no statistical difference between individuals who had no challenger (and thus little to no

campaign spending) and individuals who faced well-funded challengers. Money has an
effect on elections, but that effect does not bleed over in the length of judicial careers.
Strategic Retirement in State Supreme Courts

The decision to retire can occur for numerous reasons. From old age, job

dissatisfaction, to wanting to spend more time with the grandkids, the decision to retire
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from any job has multiple inputs, and justices on state supreme courts are no different.
These individuals however, have different goals to consider. Justices on state supreme

courts may have political motivations for the timing and reasons they retire. Despite
claims from reform groups that the Missouri Plan and other merit-based selection systems

mitigate the effect of politics on judicial behavior, these justices still make decisions

based on ideology. Indeed, like judges in the federal system, justices in systems which
utilize appointments are able to calculate the likelihood that their successor will share
their ideological disposition.

As my research demonstrates, they are therefore more likely to retire when they
share a similar ideology with that of the appointing body. This is not to say that justices
in electoral systems do not also engage in strategic retirement, merely that their
calculations are different. Justices in electoral systems do not have the ability to predict

nearly as easily the ideology of their permanent successor. Open seat elections are
inherently difficult to forecast, leaving sitting justices unsure of the outcome if they
retire. Even though the institution of election leaves them insufficient information

regarding their successor, it still encourages a type of strategic behavior. Justices whom
feel they may lose their next election are more likely to retire than risk electoral defeat.
The cost of retirement is the loss of incumbency and power, while the loss of an

election is significantly more costly. Risk-averse justices faced with this situation have
the option to behave strategically. Unlike the claims articulated by judicial reform
groups, appointment mechanisms do not sever or even diminish political influence on

justices' behavior. Modifying the institutions within which they operate only channels
the political behavior differently, or introduces new ways for political behavior entirely.
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Methodological Contribution

Event history analysis has a short but valuable history in political science
research. At its core, event history analysis in concerned with the time until an event
occurs, and then models what factors increase or decrease the likelihood of this

occurrence. The nature of careers, in this case judicial careers, are a natural fit for being
analyzed using event history. As this work has shown, judicial tenure is best understood
as time at risk. Each individual justice in my sample should be considered at risk of

leaving the bench in any number of ways, each of which can be specifically modeled.
The judicial career of any individual is the time until an event occurs, with intervening
markers along the way. For individuals with a long tenure on the court, this could be

either a history of successful elections or retentions3 . The examination of elections in
isolation fails to recognize numerous inputs along the way. The question of why

individuals lose elections is just as valuable as under what circumstances are individuals
at an increased risk for losing an election. Event history analysis is robust enough to
answer these questions.
The Future of State Court Research

While once Brace and Hall (2001, 99) could write, "There is a remarkable and
unfortunate asymmetry between the political importance and the methodological
usefulness of state supreme courts and the attention given to them by the research
community," I feel this time has since passed. The study of state supreme courts has
blossomed into a methodologically rich and robust subfield within judicial politics. The
study of state supreme courts is increasingly appealing as the institutional variation across

A judicial career is also ripe for a repeated event analysis within the event history context.
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the states allows for a truly comparative analysis. This variation allows researchers to
gain significant leverage over causal questions.

It is this institutional variation would I feel should be further exploited in the

upcoming years concerning the analysis of state supreme courts. The process ofjudicial
decision-making should be relatively similar across all courts of last resort; however,
there are should be observable differences in how cases are decided, how opinions are

drafted, and in states which give their courts discretionary jurisdiction, differences in the
types of cases they take. The State Supreme Court Data Project has facilitated much of
this work; however, specialized questions still require individualized data collection,

which has prevented many interesting and timely questions from being analyzed. A longterm funded project to collect data for decisions in all 50 states would serve the discipline
greatly.

There has been a trend, both historically and currently, to analyze a specific issue

or case type before state supreme courts. Canes-Wrone, Clark, and Park (2012) are the
most recent work in this trend. Analyzing abortion decisions, they develop a model of
judicial decision-making, which seeks to explain the observable differences across states
which use public elections, including retention elections. While the work is both

theoretically and empirically rich, their findings are far from parsimonious. Much of the
foundation of the judicial politics subfield was built on the parsimonious nature
concerning personal attribute models, which led to the attitudinal model (Segal and
Spaeth 2002). Work on state supreme courts, while borrowing considerably from this
literature, has yet to develop its own parsimonious model. Certainly, there should be
numerous commonalities across all courts, which will allow for the development of a
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model of judicial decision-making writ large. While institutions should play a role in the
disposition of cases, the role ofjustices in a court of last resort is the same across all
states. I feel a general model ofjudicial decision-making could be developed for state
courts, recognizing that while their decisions are still open to appeal, the process is rare,
as is oversight from the federal judiciary.
As a discipline however, I feel the best service we can do is to continue to

examine the claims of both judicial reform groups and defenders ofjudicial elections like
the Federalist Society. To this end, my next project examines which method of selection
has the greatest ideological congruence with the populace of their respective states.

Using data on the 51 state supreme courts, I will examine using hierarchical time series,
how long, if ever, systems converge on the ideology of the public, thus examining the
representative function of the judicial branch in the states. This research will provide
further information to the accountability vs. independence debate.

Also, while the PAJID scores are the best measures of individual justice ideology

that we have, they have two flaws. First, they are invariant with respect to time. Justices
who serve on the bench for any number of years retain the same ideology score.
Considering what we know of U.S. Supreme Court Justices (Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and
Segal 2007), it is quite likely that ideological drift does occur over the tenure of a

justice's career. Second, the PAJID scores were created using the Berry et al. state and
government ideology scores as an important factor. The way in which the PAJID scores

are calculated, the measures for justices in any appointment system take into account
institutions, which have little effect on the justices appointment, and thus miss specifying
the measure. A new measure ofjustice ideology could be created by using a method of
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analyzing iterated votes to construct a latent measure of ideology, like that which was
done by Martin and Quinn (2002). This measure would take into account ideological
drift over time, and be responsive to changes in the types of cases over time and regional
variations concerning the nature of party identification.
Lastly, arising from the work done here, there appears to be a significant question

concerning the nature of the tenure of women and minorities on state supreme courts. As
the analysis contained herein has demonstrated, women are much more likely to have
considerably longer tenures then men, while minorities are more likely to have

significantly shorter tenures. While it has demonstrated elsewhere (see Hurwitz and
Lanier 2012) that women and minorities face little difficulty getting on the bench in state
supreme courts across all the methods of selection, my research has demonstrated that

there may be some factors either increasing, or decreasing, their likelihood of retention

across the various systems. We simply need more research in this area, coupled with a
larger sample than the one here, to actively engage this question with the needed
statistical leverage.

At the beginning of this work I talked about the events that occurred in Iowa in
2010. Three sitting justices, including the chiefjustice, lost their bids for retention. In
the entire previous history of Iowa, not a single justice had lost a bid for retention, yet in
2010, three were removed at once. This was a historic event, not only for Iowa but for
retention elections as a whole. Justices in retention election states have traditionally had

easy re-elections, most times skating through without the need to campaign or even raise
money. There are notable exceptions to this trend, and most individuals remember names
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like Rose Bird, David Lanphier, and Penny White because they are among the rare
individuals who have been removed in Missouri Plan states by the voters.

A question has been raised that perhaps something has patently changed
concerning the nature of retention elections. Following the decision in Citizens Unitedv.
Federal Election Commission (2010), some have posited that retention elections provide
an outlet where advocacy groups will get the largest payoff for money spent (Sample
2011). Considering justices in these systems rarely need to fiindraise and campaign to
retain their seats, a moderately funded campaign against them will have significant
payoffs for groups wishing to oust a justice.

While the event in Iowa received the most press coverage, in 2010 interest groups
also actively spent money trying to remove a justice in Illinois. Furthermore, many

commentators have expressed concern that the occurrence in 2010 was not just a blip on
the screen, but the beginning of a trend. Iowa's governor, Terry Branstad, voiced
concerning that the remaining Iowa justice who did not stand for retention in 2010,
Justice David Wiggins, will face a well-organized campaign (Boshart 2011).

The substantive findings of this dissertation demonstrate that institutions

condition certain types of behavior in state supreme courts, but that they can also have
other effects that condition the behavior of those not serving on these courts. Canes-

Wrone, Clark, and Park (2012) demonstrate that justices in retention election states are
cognizant of votes they cast on high saliency issues, specifically abortion; though,

considering the 2010 retention elections in Iowa, these findings likely should apply to
other issues like gay rights and the death penalty. The response that Canes-Wrone et al.
find is likely not a direct function of the electorate, as the electorate would have to be
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made aware of said decisions in some fashion before they could respond. It is the

institution of uncontested retention elections that has given rise to interest groups in these

situations and it is the history of retention elections that has ill-equipped justices to
respond. For the 2012 election cycle, two things are certain:

First, justices standing in retention elections that do not encounter interest group
spending will likely be retained at the same level as justices in electoral states that face no
challengers. Second, justices standing in retention elections that do encounter interest

group spending will have a much more difficult time being retained than most justices in
electoral states which do have challengers. The most important difference is, nearly

every justices standing for re-election in states which use partisan or non-partisan
electoral methods to staff their bench are facing a challenger, while only four of the
twenty-one justices in retention election states are facing interest group challenges to
their legitimacy.

The debate concerning the nature ofjudicial selection mechanisms in the U.S. is

not likely to go away soon. The implications have distinct policy effects that could
significantly modify the rule of law in many states. This debate is valuable, as it serves
to engage the public and make them consider the way the judiciary is constituted and the
method by which it is staffed.

Furthermore, this engagement with the public will likely increase efficacy in the
judicial system by familiarizing them with its role in society. This debate however,
should not be based on normative assumptions and outright myths. As social scientists,

we should attempt, as I have here, to take these testable hypotheses and subject them to
empirical scrutiny. Considering one of the goals of science is to generate knowledge, I
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see social scientists as having no higher calling outside of giving the public empirical
information to motivate their political decisions.

